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ABSTRACT
Terrorism is a continuing international concern which has particularly plagued the
security of Western Europe. This thesis analyzes probable trends in terrorism in the 1990s
in this region. The thesis examines the sources of terrorism affecting Western Europe:
indigenous and foreign terrorist organizations. Semtex and nuclear materials that could
contribute to future terroristic acts are discussed, as well as current nationalist-separatist
movements in Western Europe, with particular emphasis on the ETA and the FLNC. The
potential significance for terrorism of immigration and the implementation of the Single
European Act in 1993 is considered. Finally, the thesis reviews cooperative efforts to
combat terrorism within Western Europe. The cooperative effort by European
governments to deter and deal with terrorism must be expedited to keep pace with the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Terrorism has been a continuing security challenge in Western Europe. The main
sources of terrorist activity which have plagued Europe during the past twenty years
have been indigenous left-wing ideologically-motivated terrorist groups, indigenous
nationalist-separatist movements, and foreign terrorist organizations, primarily from the
Middle East. Although Marxist-Leninist ideology has been discredited with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, left-wing terrorist organizations will continue to be
active in Western Europe, probably concentrating on business- and industry-related
targets. Such groups may even turn to nuclear targets in efforts to gain massive public
attention to promote their cause and political objectives.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has caused a shift in world power which
could increase the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons. The lack of central control in the former Soviet Union may allow valuable
weapons-grade material, expertise, and technology to reach nations which covet nuclear
weapons and might use such weapons in a terroristic mode. Compounding this problem
are the increasing stocks of civilian plutonium which are stored inadequately and are
susceptible to theft by terrorists.
The urge for national self-determination is a powerful incentive which has been
stimulated with renewed passion in Eastern Europe. As the wave of nationalism spreads
across Europe, such movements could possibly lead to a new surge of terrorist violence
in Western Europe. Nationalist-separatist terrorism in France and Spain seems, however,
to have been unaffected to date by the nationalist phenomena in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.
Despite its denial of involvement in terrorist activities, the Soviet Union (via the
KGB) played a major role in support of international terrorist organizations attacking
Western Europe. The KGB trained, assisted, and encouraged terrorist groups worldwide,
most notably the Palestine Liberation Organization. With the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, however, the KGB has reportedly
discontinued support and training of terrorist organizations. Although the former
Warsaw Pact countries have evidently ceased their support of terrorism, unemployed
terrorist specialists in those countries could look for employment in Western Europe or
be hired by Middle Eastern terrorist organizations eager to attack targets in Western
Europe.
Middle Eastern terrorist activity will continue to be a major security concern for
Western Europe, especially as the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism continues.
Further compounding this problem will be Europe's continued struggle to manage the
influx of foreign immigrants, notably the large number of Muslim minorities. Adding
to an already substantial Arab population, this influx could conceivably assist terrorist
networks and infrastructures aimed at Western Europe.
Despite world efforts to control and detect the unlawful use and transfer of
Semtex and other plastic explosives, Semtex will continue to be a viable option for
terrorist activities. Already at the disposal of many terrorist organizations, Semtex is
readily available, easy to conceal, hard to detect, and will continue to to be virtually
uncontrollable.
As Western Europe approaches its "open frontier" by 1 January 1993, the
manifestations of terrorism will continue to plague its governments. With the advent
of the Single European Market, European governments must make coordinated efforts
to identify, locate, track, and apprehend possible terrorists, who will be able to move
more freely in Europe as border controls are removed. Western Europe will continue
to be highly threatened by terrorist activity due to the abundance of targets which attract
both indigenous and foreign terrorist organizations. The rise in illegal immigration, the
freer movement of people (including terrorists), the removal of internal border controls,
and the absence of an effective policing system once border controls are removed,
suggest that terrorism will continue to threaten Western Europe in the 1990s.

I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a continuing subject of international concern and has been one
of the most serious challenges facing NATO and Western European democracy
and security in the past twenty years. Terrorism is a phenomenon which experts
find difficult to define. There is no consensus on a universally accepted
definition. It is a phenomenon considerably easier to describe than to define. The
problem of defining terrorism "is not one of semantics; rather, it is one of politics,
perspectives, and above all social values." 1 Consequently, one observer's
definition of a terrorist describes another person's freedom fighter. For the
purpose of this thesis, a definition widely accepted within the United States
government suggests that:
[tjerrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state
agents, usually to influence an audience. International terrorism is terrorism
involving citizens or territory of more than one country. It is the unlawful
use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to
coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political,
religious, or ideological objectives. 2
'Richard D. Benson, LTC, USA and James E. Riley, LTC, USA, European
Terrorism: The U.S. Military Command Crisis Management Process . Newport,
Rhode Island: The Naval War College Center for Advanced Research, June 1981,
p. 6.
2Peter S. Probst, "The Terrorist Specter of the 1990s," Defense 92,
January/February, p. 20. See also Joint Pub 1-02.
However defined, terrorism's purpose is usually apparent, which is to inspire
fear, intimidation, or coercion. Terrorism is often the political tool used by
nations or groups considered "weak" or without the ability to wage overt war.
Common tactics employed by terrorists are bombings, hostage taking, arson,
sabotage, assassinations, kidnappings, armed attacks, and hijacking.
With the above in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the major
sources of terrorism in Western Europe and to discuss probable trends in
terrorism in this region. Although terrorism will continue in the 1990s, terrorist
activities may take on significantly different forms. The traditional activities (e.g.,
hostage taking) normally associated with left-wing ideologically-motivated
terrorist groups may diminish, while indigenous separatist movements and
associated domestic violence may become more prominent. The causes for this
change are varied, ranging from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
failure of Marxism-Leninism to the effects of the Gulf War on state-sponsored
terrorism.
In the past, terrorists have specifically targeted the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), as well as other democratic institutions. Because of
NATO's perceived Western "imperialistic" and capitalistic overtones, it is an
attractive target for those who embrace Marxist-Leninist ideology or Islamic
fundamentalism. NATO may become a less attractive target for terrorists since
the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989-1991 has discredited Marxism-Leninism as
well as the groups which support this ideology.
With the release of all Western hostages from Lebanon, hostage-taking also
appears to be a waning terrorist tactic, whereas bombings have taken on greater
significance, especially with the abundant availability of the plastic explosive
Semtex. Furthermore, nuclear terrorism may also take on greater significance as
entrepreneurs in former Soviet republics may entertain notions of selling
weapons-grade material and/ or nuclear devices for hard currency to certain
Middle Eastern and other Third World countries.
More than any other continent, Europe appears to be the preferred
battlefield and playground for terrorist activity. Western Europe, in particular,
has been plagued by numerous terrorist incidents in the past decade. For
example, from 1977 to 1987, over 6000 terrorist incidents occurred in the world,
leaving 4004 people dead and 8091 wounded. 3 "In 1990, the last year for which
annual statistics are available, international terrorists struck in 73 countries, killing
193 and injuring 675.
"
4 Within the last decade, however, close to 2000 terrorist
attacks took place in Western Europe alone.
Two main sources contributing to Western Europe's political violence are its
indigenous terrorist organizations and foreign terrorist organizations operating on
European soil. Europe's indigenous terrorist groups comprise both left-wing
ideologically-motivated groups, such as Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF) and
3Bruce George and Timothy Watson, "Terrorism," Tane's NATO Handbook,
1990-91, Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, Sentinel House, 1990, p. 345.
4
Probst, p. 20.
Italy's Red Brigades (BR), and nationalist-separatist groups, such as Spain's
Basque Fatherland and Liberty group (ETA) and the Corsican National Liberation
Front (FLNC) in France. Although the former strand of terrorism, which
predominated during the 1980s, has subsided, the latter source of terrorism
appears to be on the increase.
The second source of terrorism in Europe is from foreign terrorist
organizations based outside Europe which are sponsored primarily by Middle-
Eastern countries in which Islamic fundamentalism is prominent. Such groups
operate transnationally. The most prominent is the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and its associated factions. Dennis Pluchinsky, a leading
authority on terrorism, suggests five factors which may explain the proclivity of
Middle Eastern groups for conducting terrorist activities in Europe. They are that
Western Europe offers a logistical infrastructure, ease of transportation, abundant
and attractive targets, immediate worldwide publicity, and an alternate
battleground for terrorist activity away from the authoritarian and tightly secured
nature of most Middle Eastern states. 5
Western Europe is such a lucrative target for terrorists that terrorist
organizations not only conduct activity unilaterally but are also involved in an
extensive network among themselves. Furthermore, a majority of Europe's
indigenous terrorist groups and foreign groups operating in Europe were given
"Dennis Pluchinsky, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe: A
diagnosis and Prognosis," Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 6, NO.3, Summer 1986, p. 6.
assistance and a safe haven by the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact
countries. This thesis will briefly review the former Soviet Union's contribution
to conducting and supporting terrorist activity in Western Europe prior to the
political upheavals of 1989-1991. Particular attention will be devoted to the
operations of the Soviet political police, known as the KGB (Komitet po
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti-Committee for State Security).
The Soviet Union provided sanctuary and training to a myriad of terrorist
organizations in the past, yet little evidence exists of direct links between Soviet
support and terrorist groups operating in Western Europe." Since the
implementation of glasnost, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the break-up of the Soviet Union
in 1991, otherwise unattainable information on Eastern European and Soviet
sponsorship of Western European terrorist activity has become more readily
available.
Although primarily considered an espionage and intelligence-gathering
organization, the KGB has been implicated in international terrorism targeted
against Western Europe. The KGB pursued the former Soviet Union's goals of
fostering a "disunited and weak Europe" with great effort.7 To accomplish its
''Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: Choosing the
Right Target . Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1981, p. 3.
7Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB . New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House
Publishers, 1977, p. 24.
objectives, the KGB worked with and influenced every major terrorist group
operating in Western Europe and the Middle East.
A third source of Western European terrorism is from ethnic-separatist and
nationalist terrorist groups. Long-suppressed nationalist desires, associated ethnic
and religious rivalries, and minorities demanding self-determination have been
unleashed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a result of the
political upheavals which began in these regions in 1989. As such previously
suppressed desires are finding expression in the East, similar passions of national
self-determination could be stimulated in Western Europe as well. Ethnic
terrorism and domestic violence resulting from nationalist-separatist movements
could be an important trend in Western Europe in the 1990s.
Most of the European Community is on the verge of becoming a Europe
without borders. With the implementation of the Single European Act (SEA) by
the end of 1992, the EC will be a single market where physical, technical, and
fiscal barriers are removed. With the loosening of border controls, however, the
EC will also find itself facing a number of vexing issues which could involve
terrorism. Europe's continued struggle against terrorism will be further
complicated by the need to control immigration. The European Community (EC)
is battling to curb the influx of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, mainly
from Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean region. This may further
increase Europe's vulnerability to international and state-sponsored terrorism as
well. Europe's concern with terrorism will increase as the resurgence of Islamic
fundamentalism continues to mount. s Foreign immigration, specifically the large
influx of Muslim minorities, may further complicate this problem. In short, a
greater number of terrorists and those who support terrorist activity may have
easier access to Western Europe. As Europe further integrates and eliminates
border controls, the possibility of enhanced terrorist activity also increases.
Finally, as Europe's "Open Frontier" is realized in most of the EC by 1993,
police cooperation to combat international crime will take on greater significance.
Mechanisms are currently in place to combat terrorism in Europe, such as
INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization), but there will be a need
for further cooperation as border controls are eliminated. The coordinated efforts
by European governments to identify, locate, track and apprehend possible
terrorists, who will be able to move freely in Europe as border controls are
relaxed, could prove to be an arduous and complex task. In spite of its efforts,
Western Europe will probably continue to be a significant battlefield where
terrorist activity will be played out. Despite the recent easing of tensions between
the East and West, terrorism will remain an international and global dilemma,
and organizing the ability to counter it will prove to be one of the most serious
security challenges facing Western Europe and NATO today.
8Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security Beyond the Cold War . London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p. 59.
II. INDIGENOUS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
A. TERRORIST OBJECTIVES/INCIDENTS AGAINST NATO
Western Europe is perceived by most of the European terrorist movements
as the stage upon which
the global conflict between the international proletariat and imperialist
bourgeoisie is played out. ...Moreover, the Western powers are seen as being
controlled politically and militarily by the United States and economically
by multinational corporations. To terrorists, this assumed unification and
integration of the imperialist strategy is manifested through NATO, causing
it to become an important terrorist target.9
Hence Western Europe, and especially Germany, are particularly susceptible to
terrorist attacks. Germany is especially risky for Americans since the Federal
Republic contains the single largest overseas contingent of U.S. military
installations and accounts for 80 percent of all USEUCOM installations in NATO
Europe. 10
"NATO is also an attractive target because its supranationality makes it a
common enemy to all European terrorist groups; thus the struggle of each one
immediately assumes a wider dimension." 11 NATO officials, soldiers, bases,
strategists, propaganda, and military installations, as well as the buildings of
9David Laufer, "The Evolution of Belgian Terrorism," in Juliet Lodge, edv The
Threat of Terrorism, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 191-192.
10Benson, p. 3.
"Ibid., p. 194.
multinational corporations, are common targets for terrorists in Western
Europe. 12 NATO is viewed as '"the most obvious expression of the highest stage
of capitalism: imperialism/. ..at the same time [NATO is seen as]. ..a function of
permanent social domination and the last rampart of the capitalist mode of
production." 13
European terrorist organizations fall into two broad categories: separatist
groups such as the Provisional IRA, the Basque ETA, and the Corsican FLNC; and
ideologically-motivated groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West
Germany, the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy, Action Directe (AD) in France, and the
Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC) in Belgium, to name the most
important. 14
Because Belgium is the seat of the treaty organization and the location of
NATO headquarters, Belgium has been highly valued by terrorists as an
observation and operations center since the beginning of the 1980s. 1S Belgium's
link with NATO has therefore provided an incentive for terrorist activity. In 1984,
12Alex Schmid, "Goals and Objectives of Interational Terrorism," in Robert O.
Slater and Michael Stohl, ed., Current Perspectives on International Terrorism .
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988, p. 64. See also Paul Wilkinson, "Support
Mechanisms in International Terrorism," in Robert O.Slater and Michael Stohl,
eds., Current Perspectives on International Terrorism . New York: St. Martin's




15Foreign Broadcast Information System, Western Europe-91-020, "Worldwide
Terrorist Threat Discussed," LE FIGARO, 30 January 1991, p. 23.
Belgium's indigenous terrorist group, the Cellules Communistes Combattantes
(CCC), began a campaign against NATO and the United States. Its operations
were linked to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles deployed in
Western Europe. The CCC carried out numerous attacks against NATO
installations and companies associated with NATO. 16
In the first four months of the CCC campaign, eight targets were attacked
because of a perceived or an obvious connection to NATO. Whether the
target was a NATO [defense] contractor, political party offices or NATO
infrastructure, the CCC went to great lengths to describe the alleged
connection of the target, the pernicious nature of NATO and the place of
that attack within the overall context of the wider anti-NATO campaign of
all European guerrillas. 17
The NATO airport transmission antennae, fuel pipelines, and the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) are examples of objectives targeted
by the CCC. 18
Although the CCC has been successful in conducting terrorist operations,
France's Action Directe (AD) has proven to be France's notorious terrorist group.
"A left-wing extremist group, AD initially targeted French Government and
corporate interests as part of an anti-capitalist campaign; in mid-1984 however,
the group began to target facilities involved with NATO." 19 AD ideology links




19George and Watson, p. 346.
10
together various concerns associated with the extreme left: anti-colonialism, anti-
Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-militarism. 20
Between 1979 and 1990, AD claimed responsibility for over fifty attacks,
most notably its attack on INTERPOL Headquarters in May 1986. Other AD
targets include government buildings, both Jewish and American institutions, and
businesses, especially those connected with computers.21 Computer-related firms
were chosen because terrorists viewed computers as "the favored tool of people
who dominate. They [computers] serve to exploit, to document, to control and
punish." 22
France's most active terrorist group today is the Corsican National
Liberation Front (FNLC). Although not specifically anti-NATO, they have carried
out over 600 bombings in Corsica and on the French mainland, choosing targets
related to the French "occupation" of the island. 23 Chapter five will cover FLNC
activities in greater detail.
20Edward Moxon-Browne, "Terrorism in France," in Juliet Lodge, ed., The




"Edward Moxon-Browne, "Terrorism in France," in William Gutteridge, ed.,
Contemporary Terrorism . Institute for the Study of Conflict. New York: Facts
on File Publications, 1986, p. 131.
23Moxon-Browne, in Lodge, p. 221.
11
One of Europe's most "durable and dangerous terrorist groups" is the Red
Army Faction (RAF). 24 The RAF evolved from the Baader Meinhof Gang which
was an "offshoot of the student movement and the anti-Vietnam protests in the
60s and 70s." 2 ' The RAF has anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-military
beliefs. 26
Between 1984 and 1985, bombings and arson attacks were intensely targeted
at NATO installations, American personnel and equipment, maneuvers, and
training programs. 27 In January 1985 the RAF and the AD formed a loose pact
to fight against what they perceived was "NATO imperialism."
"The RAF's outer circle bombed nuclear-, [defense-] and computer-related
companies, and its hard core assassinated business and government figures."28
For example, the RAF assassinated the Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Dr. Alfred
Herrhaussen in November 1989, and in July 1990 they aborted an attempt to
assassinate Hans Neusel, State Secretary for the Minister of the Interior. 29 These
attacks and attempted attacks emphasized the increased sophistication of the
24George and Watson, p. 347.
2:>Schmid, p. 75.
26George and Watson, p. 346.
27Eva Kolinsky, "Terrorism in West Germany," in Juliet Lodge, ed., The Threat
of Terrorism, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, p. 66.




group and its anti-capitalist cause.30 A communique issued by the RAF
following the assassination attempt of Hans Neusel in July 1990 revealed the
RAF's commitment to "a long phase of struggle against the newly arisen Greater-
German/Western European world power. "M
Other attacks directed against NATO were the failed bomb attack on a
NATO school at Oberammergau in December 1984 and the successful sabotage
of a NATO pipeline in West Germany in April 1985.32 Although German
reunification led to the arrest of a majority of RAF terrorists who formerly held
refuge in East Germany, the recent assassination of Detley Rohwedder on April
1, 1991 is a signal that a new generation of German terrorists may be on the rise.
The murder of Rohwedder, chairman of the largest company in the world
(Treuhand), indicates that the RAF is still a threat today. Its goal continues to be
the fight against the '"military-industrial complex'of Western capitalism."33
The most lethal of the major European terrorist groups during the past two
decades has been Italy's Red Brigades (BR). 34 The BR has conducted an
30
Ibid., p. 347.
31 Dennis Pluchinsky, "Terrorist Documentation/' in Yonah Alexander, ed.,
Terrorism-An International Tournal, Vol. 14, #2. New York: Crane, Russak, and
Company, Inc., 1991, p. 199.
32Schmid, p. 72.
33Francine S. Kiefer, "Murder Signals New Generation of German Terrorists,"
Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1991, p. 6.
^George and Watson, p. 347.
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extensive number of murderous attacks targeted at the Italian establishment
which it considers the "oppressors of the society" BR usually targets the leading
political, judicial, and domestic industrial figures and premises. 3 "1
The most notorious incident involving NATO was BR's kidnapping of U.S.
General James Dozier in 1981.% During his captivity, General Dozier was
questioned by his kidnappers about NATO and the location of U.S. nuclear
weapons. 37 This apprehension of a prominent, international figure was seen as
an international plan to disrupt NATO. 38
The main terrorist threat within NATO countries today is from ethnic
terrorism, predominantly the Basque Separatist Group ETA in Spain and the
IRA. 39 Although Northern Ireland is plagued with various revolutionary and
loyalist groups, the largest terrorist group is by far the Irish Republican Army




37Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism-Defining the
Threat . McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers,
Inc., 1986, p. 153.
38Christopher Seton-Watson, "Terrorism in Italy," in Juliet Lodge, edv The
Threat of Terrorism, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, p. 109.




predominantly Protestant [Northern] Ireland with the Irish Republic."41 Its other
principal political objective is the withdrawal of British troops from Northern
Ireland. The IRA has also launched attacks against bases of the British Army of
the Rhine in Germany. 42
The above-mentioned terrorist groups and their atrocities are an indication
that a war is being waged in Western Europe against NATO, in which NATO
installations and American personnel in particular are frequent targets. 43
In 1986 and 1987 alone, there were 308 reported domestic and international
terrorist operations in the nations of Western Europe. This figure represents
20% of all reported terrorist attacks worldwide.44
B. TERRORIST GROUP COOPERATION
It is quite evident that European terrorists cooperate with one another both
indigenously and internationally. In addition, the coordinated activities in 1986
of West Germany's Red Army Faction, France's Action Directe, and Belgium's
41 Peter J. Sacopulos, "Terrorism in Britain: Threat, Reality, Response," in
Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism—An International Journal, Vol. 12, #3. New
York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1989, p. 154.




Fighting Communist Celles clearly show that both the United States and NATO
are definite priorities on terrorists' target lists. 45
RAF and Action Directe have developed stronger links, and have formed a
loose Euro- terrorism alliance of extreme left groups. In the case of these
groups there are two distinct targets: their own domestic governmental and
legal systems, and NATO and defense-related targets in Europe as a
whole.4
Right-wing terrorist groups in Western Europe maintain a loose alliance with one
another in order to exchange information and intelligence, engage in joint training
exercises, and perhaps for the purpose of trading in arms as well.47
A considerable degree of mutual aid exists among those terrorist
organizations that also profess leftist ideologies. For example, in October 1976,
a meeting described as the 'world terrorist international' was held in Florence,
Italy, and was attended by representatives of sixteen organizations, including BR,
RAF, ETA, and the IRA.48 The purpose of this meeting was based on a previous
4:1Arnold Williams, Col., USA, "The International Threat," in Yonah Alexander,
ed., Terrorism--An International Journal Vol. 10, #3. New York: Crane, Russak,
and Company, Inc., 1987, p. 225.
4bWilkinson in Slater, p. 89.
47Thomas C. Tompkins, Military Countermeasures to Terrorism in the 1980s .
Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, August, 1984, p. 20.
48Shlomi Elad and Ariel Merari, The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism, Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies. Telaviv University: Paper No. 26, August 1984, p.
40.
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conference which "emphasized the need for tighter cooperation between the
socialist countries and movements of national liberation."49
The evidence shows that a loosely coordinated alliance of these groups is
trying to mount a Western European campaign against NATO. Although they
have not organized under one central leader, they do have similar goals, believing
they are:
fighting for the cause of 'proletarian internationalism' attacking what they
term the 'totality of the imperialist system' in its capitalist heartland. ...All the
groups in this alliance are bitterly anti-American, anti-capitalist, anti-NATO,
anti-militarist, and anti-Zionist. 5"
European terrorist groups coordinate uniformly on common targeting. The
1985 assassination of General Rene Audran in Paris clearly gave evidence of the
direct and close operational cooperation between the RAF and AD. Italy's BR and
Germany's RAF have also collaborated together on common targets, including the
Dozier operation. There is further evidence that other European terrorist groups
such as the Popular Forces of April 25th in Portugal (FP-25) and Revolutionary
Organization 17 November, a Greek Marxist-Leninist group, model themselves
after the RAF and AD and see themselves as a definite part of the anti-NATO
alliance."
1
In the 1980s, Spain's First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group
(GRAPO) also conducted bombing attacks against NATO and U.S. facilities.
44
Ibid., p. 40.




GRAPO has been "reported to have ties to the French Action Directe and the
Italian Red Brigades," and now "appears to be developing ties to the German
RAF."'2
To be sure, various European groups collaborated with each other as well
as with non-European organizations, primarily those based in the Middle
East such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and those in Asia
such as the Japanese Red Army. This informal and formal relationship
included ideological alliances, propaganda support, diplomatic assistance,
geographic sanctuary, financial help, training, organizational assistance,
intelligence, weapons supply, and operations. 153
Since the late 1970s, several countries including Libya, the People's Republic
of Yemen, Syria, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea have been found to actively back
European terrorist groups and their activities. They support in at least one of the
following ways: by providing money; by providing weapons or explosives; by
providing a safe haven; or by providing the use of diplomatic facilities and
documents.""4
C CURRENT TRENDS
Europe's indigenous left-wing terrorist organizations are experiencing a loss
of membership and morale as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
52Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander,
ed., Terrorism—An International Journal, Vol. 14, #4. New York: Crane, Russak,
and Company, Inc., 1991, p. 267.
"Yonah Alexander and Dennis A. Pluchinsky, eds., European Terrorism Today
and Tommorrow . McLean, Virginia: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992, p. xii.
54George and Watson, p. 349.
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The defeat of communism and Marxist-Leninist ideology have severely
discredited the political dogma of such left-wing groups. 55 Although dogma,
motivation, and membership enrollment are in question, leftist groups will
nevertheless continue to exist within Western Europe. Marxist-Leninist groups
will continue to cooperate with one another across borders and may strengthen
ties with ethno-separatist terrorist groups as well. Furthermore, while traditional
activities of left-wing ideologically-motivated terrorist groups may diminish,
indigenous separatist movements and associated domestic violence may become
more prominent.
The end of the Cold War could redirect left-wing activities and targeting
away from NATO. Some observers judge that NATO's Cold War "victory" could
even spell the organization's demise in the long-term now that its primary foe
(the Soviet Union) has disbanded and has relinquished control of Central Europe.
The reduction of NATO forces will perhaps make them less attractive targets for
attacks by Marxist-Leninist groups. The strong anti-capitalist stance of these
groups, however, may take on greater significance, and attacks on businesses and
tourism may also be the future focus of their activities. The incentive to attack
commercial enterprises may be strengthened as the economies of the European
Community states remain weak within the current global recession, and
capitalism receives the blame.
55Bruce W. Nelan, "Terrorism Changes Its Spots," in Time, August 26, 1991, p.
29.
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III. FOREIGN TERRORISTS ON EUROPEAN SOIL
A. MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM IN WESTERN EUROPE
As previously stated, Western Europe has been the preferred operating area
for Middle Eastern terrorist groups working outside the Middle East region.
From 1980 to 1989, Middle Eastern terrorists were responsible for 365
terrorist incidents in Western Europe. These incidents took place in sixteen
Western European countries and caused 518 deaths and more than 1,933
injuries.''6
The Islamic revolution promoted the strain of terrorism which most frequently
affected Western Europe in the 1980s. Spain, France, Austria, Cyprus, Germany,
Great Britain, and Belgium were frequent victims of Islamic revolutionary
attacks. 57 The cooperation of various EC states at political and security levels
has contributed to the decline of Middle Eastern terrorist incidents in Western
Europe since 1985. In fact, only 455 international terrorist attacks were recorded
"'Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe
in the 1980s: A Decade of Violence," in Yonah Alexander and Dennis A.
Pluchinsky, eds., European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow . McLean, Virginia:
Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992, p. 1.
vDennis A. Pluchinsky, "Middle Eastern Terrorism in Europe: Trends and
Prospects," in Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism-An International Tournal, Vol. 14,
#2. New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1991, p. 71.
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in 1990 (the most recent year for which statistics are available).
^
8 This was the
lowest number of attacks in thirteen years, dating back to 1977.™
Although progress has been made in countering Middle Eastern terrorist
activity in Western Europe, there is still cause for concern that such activity will
continue in the 1990s. The intra-Palestinian and intra-Arab struggles that have
often been a catalyst for Middle Eastern terrorist activity have not been resolved.
The unanswered questions with regard to a Palestinian homeland, the Arab-Israeli
peace talks, the stability of Lebanon, and the situation in Iraq are considered
major instigators for Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Western Europe."
In addition, major Middle Eastern "personalities" who have used terrorism
as a weapon to accomplish their goals continue to thrive. Judging from their past
records, it is hard to imagine that such figures as Yasir Arafat, Abu Nidal,
Muammar Quaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, and Abu Abbas will rule
out the use of terrorism in the future.
The existence of many large Arab communities within Western Europe may
also be conducive to attracting future terrorist activity. Most Western European
states have a substantial number of Arab students. Moreover, Middle Eastern
;8
Probst, Defense 92, p. 24. A breakdown of these incidents: bombings 62.9%;
armed attack 13.8%; kidnapping 9.9%; firebombing 5.7%; arson 4.2%;
sabotage/ vandalism 1.5%; assault 0.9%; barricade, hijacking, and other 1.1%.
?q
"Gist: International Terrorism," US Department of State
Dispatch, July 8, 1991, p. 496.
fa0Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #2, p. 72.
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businessmen and tourists frequently travel to Western Europe. 61 Additional
Muslim immigrants may enter Europe, thereby adding to an already substantial
Muslim population. 1'2 Since immigrants tend to be attracted to a well-
established area, they tend to create a "home base" which becomes self-
perpetuating, thus promoting further immigration. Moreover, the abolishment of
internal border controls resulting from the EC's mandated policy of an open
frontier will add another dimension to this problem by giving illegal immigrants
easier access between countries.
The above factors lend themselves to the "building and maintenance of a
terrorist logistical infrastructure—a network that can provide surveillance data,
conspirative apartments, arms caches, false documents, escape routes, and cover
to a terrorist hit team."63 The ability of radical Islamic fundamentalist groups to
establish such "infrastructures" in Europe will be of particular concern to
European states. This Arab network makes it easier for Middle Eastern terrorist
organizations to send "operators" to Western Europe who can then blend into the
environment. The "operators" may join existing networks or opt to establish their
own support systems. In either case, given the substantial number of Muslims
residing in Western Europe, Islamic fundamentalists have a significant network
'Ibid., p. 72.
,2Hyde-Price, p. 59.
,3Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #2, pp. 72-73.
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from which to recruit additional terrorists."4 With this infrastructure and
presence, the threat of terrorism remains, especially when the possibility exists
that a Moslem leader could make public calls for violence as illustrated in 1989
during the Salman Rushdie affair. 65
Another reason for continued Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Europe is
the abundance of Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, Jewish, European, and American
targets that would guarantee great media publicity and a platform for radical
propaganda. 66 Terrorist groups stand a greater chance of obtaining immediate
worldwide attention via attacks in Europe than via attacks in the Middle East
region. 67 Indigenous terrorist organizations have taken advantage of Western
Europe's target-rich environment in the past. Such groups as Belgium's Cellules
Communistes Combattantes, France's Action Directe, and Germany's Red Army
Faction have conducted numerous successful terrorist campaigns aimed against
NATO installations, American personnel and equipment, computer-related firms,
and various governmental buildings.
MProbst, p. 234.
65OUver B. Revell, "Terrorism: A Review of 1989 and the Prospects for 1990,'
in Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism--An International Journal, Vol. 12, #6. New
York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1989, p. 379. See also Adrian Hyde-
Price, European Security Beyond the Cold War . London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1991.
66Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #2, p. 73.
67Pluchinsky, Conflict Quarterly, p. 6.
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Because Middle Eastern terrorist groups find it "easier and less risky" to
attack targets in Europe than within their own countries, Europe will probably
continue to be the battleground for Middle Eastern terrorist groups operating
outside the Middle East. 68 To attack Israeli and Jewish targets is standard
operating procedure for many Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Due to
Israel's formidable security arrangements, however, attacks in Israel are extremely
difficult. Thus Western Europe is an attractive alternative venue for Arab
terrorists to attack Israeli and other Middle Eastern targets. 69
Lastly, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa,
underscored by the rising popularity of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, is
another cause for concern. Closely aligned with this movement in Algeria is
Sudan, whose Islamic fundamentalist regime is feared to be harboring
international terrorist organizations that once operated from Lebanon and
Libya. 70 According to an un-named U.S. analyst, Sudan has become "a place
where Iranian intelligence and the Revolutionary Guard can operate out of sight
and provide intelligence and logistical support to a terrorist operation."71 Of
concern to American policy-makers, and also to policy-makers in Western Europe,
68Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #2, p. 73.
69
Pluchinsky, Conflict Quarterly, p. 6.
70
Jane Perlez, "West Fears Sudan is Harboring Terrorist Organizations," in
Monterey Herald, January 26, 1992, Section A, p. 2.
71Tom Post, Jeffrey Bartholet, Carol Berger, and Jane Whitmore, "A New
Alliance for Terror," in Newsweek , February 24, 1992, p. 32.
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are Sudan's intentions to spread Islamic fundamentalism to surrounding
nations.' 2 As support for Islamic fundamentalism intensifies, the militancy and
extremism commonly associated with fundamentalism may intensify as well.
"[S]ome religious militants believe they need to destroy other religions, Western
society, Western cultural influences, or even the world in order to attain their
goals."73 Since passage into Spain, Italy, and France from North Africa is
relatively easy, controlling entry of Islamic fundamentalists into Western Europe
may be a burdensome endeavor.' 4 Such ease of infiltration coupled with the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism may contribute to further terrorist activity in Europe.
State-sponsored terrorism from Middle Eastern countries was drastically
influenced by the Gulf War.
State-sanctioned terrorist organizations act with the approval and
support of established governments. These groups, either on their own
or in concert with their sponsor, seek to further their objectives as well
as the aims of the sponsoring state. The states provide resources like
training facilities, hideouts and sanctuary, centers from which to plan
attacks, funds, weapons and explosives, intelligence, and credentials. 75
The dominant countries which promoted, sponsored, and supported terrorism
prior to the Gulf War were Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. It is estimated that 42
72Jane Perlez, "Sudanese Troops Push Into South," in New York Times, March
18, 1992, Section A, p. 4.
73Edward Badolato and Rodney A. Snyder, "The Future of Terrorism,"
CounterTerrorism & Security, March/April 1991, p. 28.
74Gary S. Becker, "Barbarians at the Gate-or an Economic Boon?" in Business
Week, October 7, 1991, p. 20.
75Badolato, p. 30.
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percent of all Western European terrorist incidents committed by Middle Eastern
terrorists in the 1980s can be attributed to these four countries." Such state-
sponsored terrorism from these four countries has begun to wane, however, due
to the Gulf War.
First, Syria and Iran supported the United Nations coalition, and thus were
aligned with the United States. This became a "powerful incentive" for those
states to cease sponsoring terrorist activities. 77 Iran, which has supported and
assisted the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah (the Shiite fundamentalist group
responsible for the fate of the Western hostages prior to their release), has desired
closer relations with the U.S. since the Gulf War to strengthen foreign investment
and increase international trade, especially with Europe. 78 Iran is eagerly
looking forward to increased trade with, and financial assistance from, Western
Europe and the United States in hopes of revitalizing its economy, which was
devastated by the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. 79
Syria is also looking westward in an attempt to better relations and acquire
much-needed assistance since the expiration of its sponsorship and support from
the Soviet Union. The destruction of Iraq's command and control infrastructure
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in concert with heightened security of American installations worldwide held
Iraqi terrorist efforts to a minimum during the war.80 Iraq's defeat in the Gulf
War, coupled with current economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions, has
seemed to keep the country from returning to the terrorist business. Yet Iraq's
participation in such activities in the future cannot be ruled out.
The current impoverished economic conditions in Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq
have caused these states to considerably cut back money, equipment, and support
for terrorist organizations and activities. Furthermore, Lebanon's terrorist groups,
which were normally supported by Syria and Iraq, have ceased taking hostages
and are losing the support of their sponsors. In August 1991 Hezbollah leader
Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah stated that "[g]one is the era that produced
positive results out of hostage-taking."81 According to Stephen Budiansky and
Louise Lief of U.S. News & World Report, the Gulf War brought into question the
value and effectiveness of hostage-holding by the Hezbollah in hedging or
insuring against U.S. bombing raids. "Saddam Hussein's seizure of thousands of
Westerners in the months leading up to the war apparently did little to deter
American resolve, and it ended up drawing attention away from the hostages in
Lebanon and their captors."82
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The Gulf War did bring international attention and publicity to Iraq through
the destruction and environmental terrorism brought about through Saddam
Hussein's "scorched earth" policy 83 Under this policy, Hussein unleashed
"millions of barrels of crude oil" which formed a "mega spill" in the Persian Gulf
and set aflame approximately 600 active oil wells in Kuwait. 84 One cannot rule
out the possibility that such a policy of environmental terrorism will be used in
future regional conflicts as part of a military campaign.
Finally, Lebanon's terrorist groups have also lost their sponsorship since the
aftermath of the Gulf War as Syria and Iran have shifted their political emphasis
to the West, particularly the United States, which is the leading force behind the
Middle East peace process. By getting cozy with the U.S., these two former
terrorist-sponsoring states could assist the positive developments of an Arab-
Israeli peace settlement.83 Although state-sponsored terrorism seems to have
virtually ceased at the present juncture, the possibility remains that such states
may use terrorism again as a political tool if geostrategic circumstances change.
According to terrorism expert Peter Probst:
One result of the spectacular coalition victory in the Persian Gulf war is that
nations opposed to the United States and its coalition partners are
significantly less likely to resort again to conventional warfare as a means
to advance their foreign policy goals. Rather, there will likely be an
83Ed Badolato, Col., USMC (Ret), "Pollution as Ammunition," in United States
Naval Institue Proceedings, October 1991, p. 69.
84
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85Budiansky and Lief, p. 22.
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increased reliance on indirect forms of aggression such as terrorism,
subversion, insurgency and other forms of low-intensity conflict. 8 '1
B. SOVIET (AND EASTERN BLOC) INVOLVEMENT
1. Historical Involvement/Soviet Motives
In the past, the Soviet government vehemently denied that it was
involved in international terrorism, despite accusations by the United States
government. This claim was underscored by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov,
who in 1981 was quoted in Pmvda as saying that:
terrorism is an instrument of extremism and neofascism, one of the most
terrible manifestations of the moral and political crisis of capitalist
society. ...Terrorism is absolutely alien to socialism's very nature, to [the]
Soviet people's world outlook and to the Soviet state's policy. The USSR
has always been and remains an opponent in principle of the theory and
practice of terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. 87
Under this deceptive cloak of opposition, however, the U.S.S.R. conducted a
highly effective program of international terrorism with the KGB as its right arm.
Soviet motives for supporting world-wide terrorism were varied, but included the
following precepts: that terrorism was an effective substitute for conventional
warfare, that terrorism had a destabilizing effect on Western governments, that
terrorism was an effective tool for spreading Soviet influence throughout the third
world, and that terrorism helped pro-Soviet movements attain power.88
86
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Nikita Khrushchev, in his report to the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party in 1961, said that nuclear war with the United States was an
unthinkable option. He therefore suggested that an alternate means to undermine
the stability of governments aligned with Western capitalism would be the
"training and arming [of] underground Communist cadres for sabotage, guerrilla
warfare, and terrorism."89 Although the Soviet Bloc did not create terrorist
groups per se, they did support existing terrorist organizations, especially those
characterized with a leftist or national liberation orientation. In 1969, for example,
the KGB "succeeded in persuading the Politburo to adopt the PLO as a highly
effective political tool for furthering Soviet aims in the Middle East."90 The
Soviets could therefore gain "from the very existence of the terrorists—both as a
subversive and destabilizing element and as a strategic investment for the
future."
91
The Soviet practice and support of terrorism has proven the falseness
of Gorbachev's assertion that "the Soviet Union rejects terrorism in principle."92
K9Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, New
York: Crane Russak & Company, Inc., 1984, p. 11.
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In fact, a former KGB agent openly admits that "the Soviet regime has committed
murder routinely to advance its interests abroad."93
Although the functions of the KGB were numerous, it was mainly
through the Third and Fifth Chief Directorates that the KGB was involved with
international terrorism. 94 The Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), the sister
service to the KGB, combined with the KGB to conduct destabilizing activities in
the form of labor strikes, assassinations, and the "training of local groups of the
target countries for terrorism, guerrilla warfare and 'national liberation
struggles.'"
9
^ The GRU, further dominated by the KGB, was "involved not only
in military, political, economic and scientific intelligence, but also in terroristic
acts and sabotage, as well as propaganda activities, provocations and blackmail."
These goals were accomplished mainly through the Fifth Directorate.96 The
dominance of the KGB over the GRU was underscored by the KGB's necessary
approval of a GRU officer to be stationed abroad.97 Both the KGB and GRU
planned and executed unconventional warfare operations for the Soviet military.
As exemplified in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the special purpose forces
*Tbid., p. 359.
94Amy W. Knight, The KGB, Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1990, pp. 122-124.
95Roberta Goren, The Soviet Union and Terrorism . London: George Allen &






of the Soviet Union, known as "Spetznaz," were used as "deep cover units"
deployed in advance of Soviet conventional military involvement. 98
2. KGB Operations and Training
Although the KGB was primarily thought of by the West as an
organization which targeted the civilian sector of the Soviet Union and was
strictly an espionage and information-gathering agency, KGB personnel were
directly involved with the exploitation of various indigenous terrorist groups
operating in Western Europe, most notably the Basque separatist group (ETA) of
Spain, the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany, Italy's Red Brigade (BR),
and the Middle Eastern terrorist group, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).99
The fulcrum of Soviet terrorism strategy was the connection with the
PLO. The PLO is a major international guerrilla and terrorist organization which
supports and promotes "destabilizing" campaigns conducted by other terrorist
groups around the world in efforts to combat Western "imperialism." 100 It is
further believed that the PLO was the overall coordinator of international








transactions."" Since the Soviet Union was not willing to train the majority of
Western European terrorist groups on Soviet soil, the PLO became a major
alternative. For instance, members of the ETA, whose principal political objective
is "the establishment of a Leninist orientated state," were trained by the PLO in
Czechoslovakia with KGB support. 102 Through KGB support, the PLO
influenced nearly all terrorist groups operating in Western Europe in the 1970s
and 1980s.
The RAF is considered one of Europe's most durable and dangerous
terrorist groups and caused considerable damage to West Germany in the 1980s.
The RAF has anti-capitalist, anti-NATO, and anti-imperialist beliefs which fell in
line with the socialistic goals of the Soviet Union. Although the RAF was often
critical of the Soviet Union, the RAF was "secretly subsidized" by East Germany
"whose Ministry of State Security [was] under the control of the KGB." 103
Furthermore, under the fifteen-year KGB chairmanship of Yuri V. Andropov, the
KGB enhanced its terrorist training courses both in its satellite states and in
Moscow.
KGB agents are also believed to have assisted the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) in its struggles to unify predominantly Protestant Ireland with the
Irish Republic and to force the withdrawal of the British troops which currently
101Goren, p. 4.




occupy Northern Ireland. 104 Not only did the IRA send delegates to Moscow,
but KGB agents were also sent to Dublin in efforts to "encourage terrorist
activity •" Although the KGB agents performed an advisory role, they were also
believed to have incited street riots in Britain. 10 "
A considerable degree of mutual aid exists among those terrorist
organizations that profess leftist ideologies. Links between international terrorist
groups are extensive and tight. The RAF, the IRA, the BR, and the PLO, among
others, are intricately involved with one another and provide a web of
international cooperation. In January 1966 more than 500 representatives from a
myriad of international terrorist organizations and socialist countries gathered in
Havana, Cuba, to discuss means of closer cooperation between these countries
and movements of national liberation. "", Following this meeting, known as the
Tricontinental Conference, Colonel Wadim Kotschergine of the KGB "built a
number of training camps for freedom fighters in Cuba's mountains." 107
Using urban terrorism, such as kidnapping and assassinations, the KGB
also directed its efforts to destabilize Western democracies. Turkey is a prime
104Sacopulos, Vol. 12, #3. p. 154.





example of a country in which KGB agents recruited dissidents who were
subsequently sent to the Soviet Union and to Syria for terrorist training. 108
The means whereby the KGB supported these organizations were
extensive and included the following: providing training facilities in the Soviet
Union, providing armament and coordinating armament shipments, providing
ground logistics (including attack and escape routes), using propaganda, and
lending advice and instruction for targeting countries. Together with the secret
services of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the KGB was intricately involved with
training international terrorists, harboring them when pursued, and supplying the
needed weapons on demand. 109
According to Paul Wilkinson, a leading authority on international
terrorism, the KGB followed "a generally active policy of using terrorism as a
weapon of opportunity, and Eastern Europe as a tool." 110 Even though the KGB
maintained close ties with Eastern European security and intelligence services in
the 1970s and 1980s, it continually denied all involvement related to international
terrorism. It is Wilkinson's belief that the KGB's involvement in international
108Goren, p. 106.
'"Ibid., p. 158.
"°Craig R. Whitney, "East's Archives Reveal Ties to Terrorists," in New York
Times
, July 15, 1990, Section A, p. 6.
terrorism, revealed in the multitude of now-available secret files of Eastern
European security organizations, is just the "tip of the iceberg." 111
A recent release in the Russian crime tabloid "Top Secret," revealed the
KGB's attempt to assassinate, via poisoning, the prominent novelist Alexander
Solzhenitsyn in 1971.112 Another controversial terrorist incident in which the
KGB was implicated was the 1981 assassination attempt of Pope John Paul II.
Although no "smoking gun" could be found which pointed to Moscow, the United
States had "strong suspicions" that the KGB was deeply involved in the plot. 113
"The evidence, though not conclusive as to Soviet intent, includes information
from a Bulgarian official who defected in France in July 1981 and strongly
confirms Soviet use of Bulgaria as an operational base against both Italy and
Turkey." 114 The KGB's involvement in this incident and others may never be
known, however, due to the destruction of the majority of the classified
documents by KGB officers in the past two years. 115
The Russian Government recently announced that it will release new
evidence showing that the Soviet Communist Party sponsored international
mWhitney, p. 6.
112David Remnick, "Plot to kill Solzhenitsyn reported," in Monterey County
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terrorism. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has promised to release documents
which will provide evidence that the Soviet Union supported the PLO with
armaments for terrorism against American and Israeli targets in the West. 116
The training of international terrorists by the KGB was quite extensive
and included such techniques as operating light and heavy weaponry, using
improvised explosive demolition charges and detonators, using communications
and field navigation skills, negotiating obstacles, practicing escape and evasion
methods, wearing disguises, creating fake identities, employing surveillance
techniques, and organizing and coordinating a terrorist network. 117 Since
terrorist groups cannot afford the luxury of training overtly in their own
homeland, they must rely on other countries and foreign organizations for
training facilities. Thus the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries
provided a much-needed solution to the international terrorists' fundamental
dilemma. It has since been revealed that the majority of instructors in the Soviet
training camps were KGB officers. 118 Not only did the KGB train and support
foreign terrorist groups on Soviet soil, but it also operated training camps in the
Soviet satellite countries. One such camp at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, was
funded by the USSR and run by the KGB to train numerous terrorists from all
over the world. The founders of the Italian Red Brigades (BR) were just two of
16Cable News Network's Headline News, May 25, 1992.
17Cline, p. 57.
ll8George and Watson, p. 350.
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the many terrorists who received training at this camp. 119 Other training camps
established by KGB specialists in Eastern Europe included the Varna camp in
Bulgaria, the Finsterwalde camp in East Germany, Lake Vara in Hungary, and the
Dupov camp, also in Czechoslovakia. 120
Soviet sensitivity to the damage that could result in relations with
Western European countries if the West discovered the Soviet support of
European terrorists prevented the U.S.S.R. from training Western European
terrorists in the U.S.S.R. 121 The Soviet Union therefore used surrogate countries,
such as Cuba, to further train terrorists to accomplish their goals. In the 1960s
Fidel Castro began operating guerrilla facilities in Cuba which accommodated
recruits from Latin America, Africa, Western Europe, and the Middle East. In
1965, however, the KGB took control of the Cuban General Directorate of Security
(DGI), and these training camps consequently fell under the control of KGB
officers. 122
3. The KGB's Association with "Carlos"
Perhaps the most notorious example and symbol of Soviet sponsorship
of international terrorism has been the training, support, and safe haven for Ilyich
,19Elad and Merari, p. 12.
120Cline, p. 59.




Ramierez Sanchez, known as "Carlos." Considered by many to be one of the
world's most ruthless and clever terrorists, Carlos has been responsible for a
number of terrorist activities which have resulted in massive destruction and
personal loss within Western Europe. 1^ Carlos, recruited by the KGB in
Venezuela in the mid-1960s, was extensively trained and sponsored by the KGB
for the next two decades. Carlos was first trained in Cuba under KGB agents
who oversaw the Cuban DGI. From Cuba he was sent to Moscow and studied
at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, which was under the direct
control of the KGB. 124 It was in Moscow that Carlos was indoctrinated into
Soviet policies and trained extensively in the use of violence. 125 With a
thorough background in terrorist training from the KGB, Carlos has been
implicated in various terrorist operations conducted by the BR, the ETA, the Red
Army Faction (RAF) of Germany, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Central and South American
terrorist groups as well. His liaisons among these groups have earned him their
support and the nickname "the Jackal."
According to Oleg Kalugin, a former director of the KGB, the KGB also
pressured Eastern European governments, including those of Hungary, East





Germany, and Czechoslovakia, to harbor "the Jackal." Carlos is currently believed
to be in refuge in Libya as he is alienated from his former safe haven in Syria. 126
4. The KGB's Future Ties to Terrorism
In the latter part of the 1980s, the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern
Europe apparently stopped their support of (and sanctuary to) terrorist
organizations. 127 For the most part, the KGB has been trying to persuade the
West that it is a new organization worthy of trust and mutual cooperation. In
fact, the United States and former Soviet officials have met together on several
occasions since 1989 to discuss measures for cooperative combat of international
terrorism. 128 KGB representatives have also encouraged cooperation with
intelligence services of the West to have a concerted plan to counter common
problems such as terrorism and drug smuggling. 129 Furthermore, the Fifth
directorate, responsible for using terrorism and suppressing political and religious
dissent, has reportedly been abolished. 130
126Foreign Broadcast Information System, Western Europe-91-114, "New
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The policy reversal on the part of Russia towards supporting
international terrorism was due to a number of factors, the most prominent of
which was the heavy economic and political costs the Soviet government paid to
support national liberation movements which the government believed achieved
few results. 131
Although the KGB in the Russian provinces is relatively strong, the
KGB network in former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic
States has apparently been abolished. The Russian KGB has not halted its
intelligence activities against the West but has "redirected them from political and
military spying to industrial espionage. " I32 It appears, however, that KGB
involvement in international terrorism has ceased.
5. Eastern Europe's Contribution
As was the case with the former Soviet Union, the former Warsaw Pact
countries have also been implicated in supporting and providing sanctuary to a
myriad of both Western European and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations in
the past. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, otherwise unattainable information on Eastern
European sponsorship of Western European terrorist activity has become more
131Brian M. Jenkins, The Possibility of Soviet-American cooperation Against
Terrorism . Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1989, p. 11.
132Alexander Rahr, "The KGB Survives under Yeltsin's Wing," Radio Free
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readily available. Not only have European terrorist groups cooperated among
themselves, but they also cooperated with the Soviet Union and Soviet satellites.
Recent disclosures emanating from the secret files of former communist
governments, particularlv in East Germany, further document that these
governments provided sanctuary to Middle Eastern and Western European
terrorist groups that were targeting Western Europe. 133 East Germany's
dissolved state security organization also assisted the international terrorist Ilyich
Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carlos, in contacting and aiding many members of
Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 1980s. Former GDR authorities also
cooperated with Arab and other international terrorist organizations by allowing
terrorists to operate within their territory and by trading arms and giving
assistance in training. 134 Former Czechoslovak officials have also acknowledged
that they provided the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Quaddafi with an
enormous amount of the powerful explosive Semtex, which eventually reached
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and various Palestinian terrorist groups. 135
Similarly, Bulgaria, through its National Intelligence Service and the
National Service for the Protection of the Constitution, extended help to a
variety of foreign terrorist groups from the Middle East (e.g., Syria,
133Whitney, p. 6.
134Foreign Broadcast Information System, Western Europe-91-140,
'New Papers on GDR Cooperation With Terrorists," July 22, 1991, p. 8.
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Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq) and from North Africa (e.g., Algeria) operating
in Europe. 13 '1
Bulgaria was often suspected of exporting weapons and ammunition to former
Warsaw Pact member nations and other nations such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq.
These weapons are believed to have been subsequently transferred to numerous
terrorist organizations. I3/ Additionally, both East Germany and Czechoslovakia
provided escape routes and shelter to Western European terrorist groups. 138
Files from the now-disbanded East German secret police (STASI)
demonstrate that the East German authorities attempted to establish relations with
major terrorist groups operating worldwide. 13Q The STASI files also indicate
that the East German police assisted West German terrorists with assassination
and bombing campaigns against foreign targets in Western Europe. 140 German
prosecutors estimate it will take years to apprehend former East German spies
and other STASI-connected criminals because the evidence implicating them is
buried deep within the millions of secret police files. 141 Meanwhile, the
136Yonah Alexander, European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow, p. xii.
137Chuck Sudetic, "Bulgaria to Share Arms Export Data," in New York Times,
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138Elad and Merari, p. 30.
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possibility remains that such former intelligence and security professionals who
traditionally supported terrorism may well be seeking employment in the West
to "professionalize" Western European terrorist organizations. 142
As of mid-1992, however, the former Soviet Union and countries of
Eastern Europe appear to have stopped their support of (and sanctuary to)
terrorist organizations. 143 Although Eastern European governments have
discontinued their support of terrorism, an unemployment problem remains for
those who were formerly involved in supporting terrorism. Careers of former
Eastern European security agents and those who indirectly worked for the KGB
are now in jeopardy, and those people could be looking for employment
elsewhere. Middle Eastern terrorist organizations may take advantage of this
situation and hire former Eastern European intelligence agents whose experience
in terrorist activity would be useful in attacking Western European targets.
The increasing flow of refugees and asylum-seekers from Eastern
Europe to Western Europe, coupled with Eastern Europe's connection with
worldwide terrorism, leaves EC member states vulnerable to future terrorist
attacks. Even though all countries of the EC strictly limit access to citizenship, the
142
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trend toward open borders and the ease of travel between East and West Europe
raise the probability that terrorist activity will occur. 144
'Becker, p. 20.
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IV. SEMTEX AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM
A. THE UNCONTROLLABLE THREAT OF SEMTEX
A menacing problem is the continued use of plastic explosives by terrorists.
Despite efforts to control the use of plastic explosives in international terrorism,
one particular plastic explosive, Semtex, will remain a threat to Western
democracies for years to come. In fact, the gross availability of Semtex in today's
terrorist circles causes the plastic explosive to be virtually uncontrollable. The
importance and relevance of this topic is underscored by the vast contribution
that Semtex has played in the arena of international terrorism. In 1990, close to
63 percent of all terrorist incidents committed world-wide were bombing-related
(see Appendix A). 145
Although 1990 is the most recent year for which statistics on international
terrorist incidents are available, these statistics represent a typical yearly
breakdown of the methods preferred by terrorists. Of the various methods
terrorists employ to accomplish their goals, such as assassinations and
kidnapping, bombings have proven to be the most prominent mode, thus
implicating Semtex.
Semtex was developed during World War II as an alternative to TNT, which
along with other materials of similar use, was not found to be water-resistant.
Trobst, Defense 92, p. 24.
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The positive applications of Semtex can be seen in both civilian and military
sectors. Military uses include the destruction of enemy railways, bridges, lines
of communications, vehicles, and other targets of opportunity. For civilian
purposes, plastic explosives are used mainly for tunnel and road construction,
underground mining, and the destruction of dilapidated buildings. Despite the
numerous beneficial applications of Semtex, the harmful effects of this explosive
when it is in the hands of terrorist organizations draw the most concern.
Although Semtex has been widely used by the Irish Republican Army to destroy
public facilities such as train stations and office buildings, the most notorious use
of Semtex within the last decade has been in aviation terrorism (see Appendix B).
Semtex is attractive to terrorists because of its fundamental characteristics.
It is odorless and virtuallv undetectable by both human and mechanical sensors.
Semtex's malleable property, similar to that of modeling clay, allows terrorists to
place it in tape recorders, radios, suitcase linings, and other small items which
could be smuggled onto aircraft. Its most attractive characteristic may be its
extreme destructive power by weight. Because only a small amount is required
to produce disastrous results, Semtex is the preferred choice for a contemporary
terrorist. A small amount of Semtex can accomplish a terrorist objective. For
instance, it is estimated that only 200 grams (less than Vi pound) of Semtex is
sufficient to blow a hole in the side of an aircraft. 14 '' These properties make
146Whitney, "East Archives Reveal Ties to Terrorists," p. 6.
47
Semtex one of the most prominent and insidious weapons of international
terrorists.
The major producer and supplier of Semtex in past decades has been the
powerful Synthesia Semtin chemical plant in Czechoslovakia. Although Synthesia
Semtin produced Semtex for mining purposes within the country, the former
communist government's export of the explosive caused great controversy.
Although Czechoslovakia assured the United Kingdom in 1982 that exports of
Semtex would be discontinued, the Prague government continued to export
Semtex to other East Bloc countries until 1989. 147 In an effort to mitigate his
country's embarrassing situation, Vaclav Havel, soon after becoming president of
Czechoslovakia in 1990, banned the export of Semtex and publicly apologized for
Semtex's use in terrorist activities in the past. 148 In his London speech in March
1990, however, President Havel also revealed that the former communist
government of Czechoslovakia exported "1,000 tons" (2 million pounds) of Semtex
to Libya. 149 It is believed that Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in turn
passed the explosive on to various terrorist organizations, including several
notorious Palestinian liberation groups and the IRA. 150 In fact, the Popular
147George and Watson, pp. 349-350.
148John Tagliabue, "Arms Exports Bring Profits and Pain To Czechs and
Especially to Slovaks," New York Times, February 19, 1992, pg. A4.
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Front for the Liberation of Palestine was implicated by some sources in the
December 1988 bombing of PAN AM flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which
killed 270 people. 1 " 1 Because of this incident world attention has been focused
on controlling and detecting Semtex and other similar plastic explosives.
One of the major participants in the fight to detect and control Semtex is
currently Czechoslovakia. Though Czechoslovakia's Foreign Trade Ministry
presently bans the export of Semtex, Synthesia Semtin has begun processing a
new Semtex, laced with an additive which makes the explosive more detectable
by security screening machines, primarily those used at airport terminals. 1 '2
Once the new Semtex is proven to be successfully monitorable, it will again be
exported. 153 Even though future Semtex exports will be easier to detect, the fact
remains that over two million pounds of "old" Semtex is still in the hands of
terrorist groups. In addition to Semtex's new processing, Czechoslovakia, via its
Foreign Trade Ministry and the Synthesia Semtin processing plant, is attempting
to further control Semtex once export becomes allowed. Synthesia Semtin and the
Foreign Trade Ministry will strictly monitor the "quantity and destination" of
l5,
Ibid.
lb2Foreign Broadcast Information System-EEU-91-138, "Additive Included in
Semtex Exports Resume," 18 July 1991, pg. 18.
'"Foreign Broadcast Information System-EEU-91-143, "Semtex Enterprise
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Semtex, placing particular emphasis on who the end-user of the product will
be. 1
"4 This is in direct contrast to previous practices involving the sale of
Semtex by Omnipol, a former foreign-trade enterprise which specialized in the
exports of arms and military technology. Omnipol has been accused of exporting
Semtex abroad without discretion and without notifying the producer of Semtex's
final destination. Even though Synthesia Semtin is taking positive steps to control
the shipment and export of Semtex, there are no guarantees that Semtex will not
fall into the wrong hands.
A global attempt to control the menace of plastic explosives was the heart
of the treaty signed in April 1991 by 40 nations, including the United States. This
treaty, aimed at the manufacturers of plastic explosives, will require explosive
manufacturers to alter the chemical composition of plastic explosives so that they
are more readily detectable by commercially available chemical sniffers. 155
Because this new manufacturing process needs more testing, the treaty will not
be implemented until 1993. Three of the leading states which sponsor
international terrorism—Libya, Iraq, and Yemen—refused to sign. Moreover, this
treaty does not affect the two million pounds of Semtex currently in circulation,
which is enough to supply world terrorism for at least 150 years. 1?6
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Two of the more recent technological developments to detect Semtex,
particularly in airport terminals, have been the Thermo Neutron Analysis (TNA)
and the mechanical "sniffer" called EGIS. TNA was developed in the 1980s, but
work on practical applications was accelerated due to the Lockerbie incident. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined that TNA technology offered
the best means of detecting plastic explosives and aggressively pushed for six
machines. By measuring nitrogen, a common substance in all plastic explosives,
the TNA could detect the presence of explosives.
The FAA never used any scientific study to see what minimal amount of
Semtex was needed to inflict aircraft damage, however. Consequently, the TNA
could detect amounts of plastic explosives as low as 2V2 pounds, but failed
miserably (8 out of 8 times) when amounts less than a pound were used. Again,
less than Vi pound is needed to bring down an aircraft. Furthermore, TNA
machines are used primarily for checked baggage and not for carry-on luggage,
even though plastic bombs could be smuggled aboard an aircraft by an
unsuspecting passenger. The FAA has installed three TNA machines at JFK,
Dulles, and Gatwick (London) airports and has plans to place three additional
machines in Miami, San Francisco and an "undisclosed airport in the Middle East"
in the near future. 13 ' Because TNA machines cost over a million dollars a copy,
the FAA is finding it difficult to persuade airlines to buy 150 TNA machines for
7Stecklow, p. E-l.
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use in both domestic and foreign airports. 158 The airlines argue that the U.S.
government should pay for these devices on the grounds that it is the
responsibility of the government to guard against international terrorism. The
EGIS mechanical sniffer is privately manufactured by Thermedics, a medical-
instrument maker. EGIS detects plastic explosives by "sniffing" the ambient air
in or around baggage and personnel. It is very sensitive and can detect traces of
explosives down to one part in 100 trillion. 1^ The drawback with EGIS,
however, is that it too, like TNA, is very expensive ($235,000). Furthermore,
EGIS' operating rate is very slow. EGIS can only process two passengers per
minute, a rate which is considered unacceptable to the airlines. Also, the EGIS
machine can be fooled if a terrorist decides to wrap his bomb in vaporless
impermeable plastic. 160 Because of the expense and the slow operating rate for
screening passengers, the airlines have shown little interest in purchasing EGIS.
Despite world efforts to control and detect the unlawful use and transfer of
Semtex and other plastic explosives, Semtex will continue to be a viable option
for terrorist activities. By the time technology finally offers a way to detect plastic
explosives, terrorists may have found a completely different bomb, making
158
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systems capable of detecting current explosives obsolete. For the time being,
Semtex will remain an uncontrollable substance favored by terrorists.
B. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
An important trend affecting terrorism in Western Europe in the 1990s is the
increased possibility of nuclear terrorism. The major sources of such a threat
stem from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the international
shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the large number of nuclear weapons
in Western Europe, and the intentions of terrorist organizations themselves. This
threat affects not only Western Europe, but also extends to the Central Asian
republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), various third world
countries, and the rest of the world, including the United States.
Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the threat of nuclear terrorism,
although real, was less imminent. This diminished threat was attributed to the
strict central governmental structure of the Soviet Union, as well as its control and
responsibility over the production and sale of nuclear materials, technology, and
related commodities. 1 '' 1 The lack of privatization in the nuclear export business
also helped dampen efforts to illicitly export nuclear weapons-grade material.
The collapse of the Soviet Union's central command in 1991, however,
compounded by "the virtual bankruptcy of the entire Soviet defense sector
lfalWilliam C. Potter, "Exports and Experts: Proliferation Risks From the New
Commonwealth, in Arms Control Today, January /February 1992, p. 32.
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(including the nuclear weapon laboratories), created an environment in which
private entrepreneurs scrambled to sign up weapon designers and to make
overseas deals, in the absence of strong central government oversight.""'2
According to Dr. Oleg Bukharin, Executive Director for the Center for Arms
Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology, there are "no signs of permanent terrorist organizations in the
former [Soviet] republics." However, the most serious threats regarding nuclear
terrorism currently facing the FSU are the possible state-supported theft of
weapons-usable materials, the sabotage of nuclear installations resulting from
hostilities between republics, and "insider" sabotage of nuclear facilities by
disgruntled employees. 163
The threat of nuclear sabotage in Western Europe is also evident in the
ongoing conflict between Bosnia/Herzegovina and Serbia. On August 8, 1992
"a foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Serbian republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina" mentioned that Serbs were prepared to conduct "kamikaze
missions" against nuclear power plants in Western Europe if the West were to
forciblv intervene in the ethnic conflict. 1 "4
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Another direct connection to nuclear terrorism resulting from the breakup
of the FSU and the subsequent ethnic upheavals is the possible transfer of nuclear
technology to states which advocate terrorism for "religious and ideological
incentives.""" As William C. Potter, director of the Center for Russian and
Eurasian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, states:
Major facilities for heavv water production, uranium mining and milling,
beryllium and zirconium metallurgy, and nuclear testing grounds are
located in the predominantly Muslim Central Asian states, with historical,
religious, and ethnic ties to countries that are known to covet nuclear
weapons."16
Consequently, nuclear weaponry and /or technology may reach certain Middle
Eastern states (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Libya) which are proponents of terrorism
as a political tool. The rumor that Kazakhstan attempted to sell nuclear weapons
to Iran must therefore be investigated thoroughly."'7
The second major factor which may increase the possibility of nuclear
terrorism is the changing international balance of power affecting nation states.
As the international system moves away from bipolarity, owing to the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the incentives for nuclear proliferation will
probably increase. Under the past bipolar system, many countries were aligned
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between friend and foe [were] clearly marked." 168 The two superpowers
maintained the balance, and countries within this balance system knew who their
friends and enemies were. Under a multipolar system, however, enemy lines are
faded and threats are not fixed. A country, instead of concentrating on only one
major confrontation, must deal with the increasing possibility of encountering
more than one enemy. The result may be a weakened alliance system and a
world in which nations are increasingly skeptical of each other. This skepticism
could lead to a more acute sense of threatened security because a country which
could relv on a superpower for protection under the bipolar system may no
longer trust such assurances in a multipolar world and must now fend for itself.
As the international system moves away from bipolarity, the nuclear security
umbrella afforded to an aligned country by a superpower may also cease to exist.
With the relative strength, credibility, and commitment of the superpower
weakened by multipolarity, nations may feel the need to develop their own
nuclear capability to protect against perceived threats to their security interests.
"States' confidence in the strength of a superpower commitment is a key element
in their decision whether or not to build nuclear forces." 169
168Benjamin Frankel, "International Political Changes and Nuclear Proliferation
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A nation seeking to improve its stature in the international scene could
attempt to develop nuclear capability. Coupled with nuclear capability is the
prestige that accompanies it. A government fighting for its legitimacy may
acquire nuclear weapons in an effort to prove it is in fact legitimate. According
to Benjamin Frankel, a "sense of illegitimacy leads to profound insecurity and
distrust, both of which tend to be confirmed by the political isolation in which
these states find themselves." 1 '"
As more of the world's nations acquire nuclear capability, the chances for
nuclear terrorism also increase, particularly if such weapons of mass destruction
are in the hands of unstable governments, irrational actors, sub-national groups,
or megalomaniacs who would possibly use such weapons in a terrorist mode. An
often mentioned scenario is one in which a shipping or commercial vessel with
an undetected nuclear device is used to hold a heavily populated port city
hostage as concessions are negotiated.
As the trend to proliferate nuclear weapons continues, nations will attempt
to acquire weapons-grade materials wherever and however possible. With an
increased demand for such materials, the chance that nuclear material could be
stolen by terrorist groups during transit also increases, especially in countries





Another trend closely associated with nuclear proliferation is the increased
proliferation of ballistic missiles. As producers increase, the chance that missiles
could be acquired "either illegally or through the global arms trade" also
increases. 171 According to Frank Barnaby, "[t]he worry is that sub-national
groups will acquire and use ballistic missiles as delivery systems for weapons of
mass destruction." 172 Now that the Soviet Union has disbanded within a newly
emerging multipolar system, one country with nuclear weapons is now divided
into several independent nations with a nuclear weapons capability- Thus the
transition itself to a new paradigm has increased nuclear weapons proliferation
horizontally.
A third factor which contributes to the possibility of nuclear terrorism in the
future is the abundance of nuclear weaponry and material in Europe. NATO may
be vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. A 1978 CIA report identified "Western
Europe's nuclear storage depots as 'the most vulnerable and therefore most likely
targets for future terrorist activity."" 73 Although many safeguards have been
upgraded since then, the threat of a terrorist incident remains. In fact, the
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possibility that sub-national or terrorist groups could attempt to obtain fissionable
material in the future is a substantial risk.
These risks exist because: a large amount of civilian plutonium is being
produced and stockpiled; a relatively small amount of such plutonium is
needed for a nuclear explosive; the technical information required to
fabricate a nuclear device is available in the open literature; and only a small
number of competent people are necessary to fabricate a primitive nuclear
device. 174
The terrorist purpose in seizing a nuclear weapon may not be detonation but
to brandish it as a threat or as a "means of capturing the world's attention." 175
To a large degree, terrorists often select newsworthy targets that guarantee great
media publicity. A nuclear terrorist incident, therefore, could be the ultimate in
media attention and might create the desired propaganda platform to "advertise
their causes to the world.
"
I/
'' For example, terrorists, opposed to nuclear
weapons or "seeking to co-opt antinuclear sentiment for their own radical political
agenda," could attack a nuclear facility in order to "ridicule the plant authorities
and, by implication, the government for inadequate security, [and] hence arouse
public concern about nuclear safety" 177 There seems to be a direct "correlation
1/4Barnaby, p. 3.
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between the escalation of global terror-violence in the past twenty years and the
innovations in the media technology that facilitate rapid dissemination of
information to large audiences: terrorists rely on the media to further their terror-
inspiring goals, and the media utilize the terrorists' acts as necessary or rewarding
news items.
"
1/8 According to Merrill Walters, a terrorist attack on NATO's
nuclear forces would have "a very high public and political impact, even if
unsuccessful." 1 ' 9
Other possible nuclear activities by either sub-national or terrorist groups are
outlined by Konrad Kellen of the RAND Corporation as follows:
[T]he making or stealing of a nuclear weapon and its detonation; the making
or stealing of a nuclear weapon for blackmail; the damaging of a nuclear
power plant for radioactive release; the attack on a nuclear-weapons site to
spread alarm; the attack on a nuclear plant to spread alarm; the holding of
a nuclear plant for blackmail; the holding off-site of nuclear plant personnel;
the theft of fissionable material for blackmail or radioactive release; the theft
or sabotage of things nuclear for demonstration purposes; and an attack on
a transport of nuclear weapons or materials. 180
Although the mere seizure of a nuclear device could satisfy a terrorist
group's objective, one cannot disregard the possibility of detonation. It has been
evident in the past that terrorist groups are concerned with nuclear terrorism.
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Successful raids on the Italian BR have revealed "documentary evidence that the
possibilities of stealing a tactical nuclear weapon were being discussed." 181 It
has also been proven that when General Dozier was kidnapped by the Red
Brigade, his kidnappers "interrogated him about NATO and U.S. nuclear weapon
locations." 182 Moreover, "members of Germany's Red Army Faction have been
apprehended with maps and drawings of nuclear storage sites and security patrol
routes."
183
In addition, "four West Germans forced their way into a Pershing
missile site and tried to destroy a missile with crow bars" in 1983. 184
Since nuclear sites are well known in Europe, "any event that is connected
with nuclear weapons, even with the delivery system in which nuclear weapons
are not involved," would raise "a great deal of hysteria and concern all over the
world, and in particular in NATO." 185
One means to counter this ongoing threat has been the International
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This convention
provides "a framework for international cooperation in the recovery and
protection of stolen nuclear material, and requires that states parties make certain
181Davies, p. 67.
182Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism . McLean,











" Adding to this counter-measure have been the advances
in modern technology where extremely sensitive detection equipment is available
to detect nuclear material that may be in the process of being transported
illegally.
Despite such sensing equipment, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a
real risk in the future. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the increasing stocks of plutonium, the
continuance of state-sponsored terrorist activities, the availability of targets, and
the motivational objectives behind sub-national and terrorist groups ensure that
the threat of nuclear terrorism will remain a critical concern for Western Europe
in the 1990s.
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V. WESTERN EUROPEAN ETHNIC/SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
A. THE NATIONALIST DILEMMA AND ITS DEFINITION
Two main strains of terrorist activity which have plagued Western Europe
in the past are indigenous left-wing ideologically-motivated terrorist groups and
indigenous nationalist-separatist movements. Although the former strand of
terrorism, which predominated during the 1980s, has subsided, the latter source
of terrorism is on the increase.
Long-suppressed nationalist desires, associated ethnic and religious rivalries,
and minorities demanding self-determination have been unleashed in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a result of the political upheavals which
began in these regions in 1989. As suggested by U.S. News & World Report,
"[t]he collapse of communism has released pent-up nationalist emotions and
started new battles over land, law and property." 187 Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union are currently in a "state of political ferment and
revolutionary change," of which nationalist-separatism is a major form of
expression. 188 National liberation movements in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union are presently underway in Gagauz, Trans-Dniester, Arkhazia,
187Robin Knight, Victoria Pope, and Peter S. Green, "Europe's New Flags," in
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188
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Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Chechen-Ingushetia, the former German Volga
Republic, Tatarstan, and Baskira. isq
The urge for national self-determination is a powerful incentive. It has been
stimulated with renewed passion in Western Europe as a wave of nationalist-
separatist movements is appearing in the East. As is the case in many of these
Eastern European countries, national borders have not reflected ethnic boundaries.
Western separatist groups may take their lead from various Balkan and Baltic
republics, among others, in an attempt to gain autonomy. As a result, the
redrawing of Eastern Europe's borders could possibly spell trouble for the West.
Furthermore," [t]he move toward a federal Europe has raised hopes among some
minorities that they can achieve greater sovereignty within a unified Europe." 190
As in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, nationalist-separatist
movements are active in Western and Mediterranean Europe. Examples include
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Basque country, Corsica, South Tirol, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Catalonia. 191
With the above trends in mind, this chapter will address Western Europe's
nationalist-separatist situation, with particular emphasis on the Corsican National
Liberation Front (FLNC) in France and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group







such as the ETA and FLNC could be an important trend in Western Europe in the
1990s. Paradoxically, just as the European Community is on the verge of a new
frontier, becoming a "borderless" entity characterized by political, technical, and
fiscal integration, ethnic groups are bursting out all over Europe "demanding as
never before the right of cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy." 192
Furthermore, the idea that "Europeanization" would put an end to nationalism is
being put to the test. "[T]he attempt to make living conditions uniform
throughout Europe may be what is bringing nationalism to the fore." 143
As with defining terrorism, defining the term "nationalism" is also
problematic. Nationalism, as with terrorism, tends to be defined differently
depending upon the definer's perspective. At times, nationalism can be
associated with "forces striving for political, social, economic and cultural
emancipation, as well as with those whose goal is oppression." 144 As Arthur
Schlesinger stated in 1981:
[Nationalism can mean.. .the determination to assert national identity,
national dignity, and national freedom of action. It can also mean the
xenophobic determination to assert these things at the expense of other
nations. 195
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As ambiguous as it may seem, however, a definition of nationalism which best
represents both those people who possess a state and those who do not is
characterized by historian Eugen Lemberg as:
a system of ideas, values and norms, an image of the world and society
which makes a large social group aware of where it belongs and invests this
sense of belonging with a particular value. In other words, it integrates the
group and demarcates its environment. 11"1
A derivative of the concept of nation, nationalism refers to the feeling of
attachment one has toward other members of the same group who collectively see
themselves as linked to one another in some way. This connection is experienced
through shared culture, religion, origins, language, and /or a combination of these
factors. Nationalism often manifests itself "in the desire of the members of a
nation to control and govern the territory in which they live." 197 Such desires
are naturally conducive to the formation of a nation-state which is characterized
by geographical boundaries. When national borders do not reflect ethnic
boundaries, however, the propensity for separation is increased. Within the
context of the nation-state, groups of ethnic or cultural commonality who view
centralized government as usurping their autonomous authority may decide to
pursue a separatist or national liberation movement. This situation is the case
with the ETA and FLNC in Western Europe.
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Ethnic separation movements may be viewed as manifestations of
nationalism. Nationalism is a forceful factor in developing separatist movements.
In such movements strength is achieved through an ethnocentrism which "fosters
pride, dignity, and related sentiments among members of the in-group, thereby
constituting a 'moral' and philosophical basis on which to demand political
sovereignty.
"
1W According to Shaw and Wong's theory of nationalistic
mobilization (See Appendix C), the "ultimate goal of nationalism is to transform
a cultural ethnic group into a nation-state."199 In Suzanne Berger's analysis,
Broadly speaking, there are two different ethnic problems in Europe. The
'old' ethnic problem is that of the ethnic minorities left on the wrong side
of national frontiers by the vagaries of war and international decision. The
'new' ethnic problem in Europe is regional ethnicity: the organization of
political demands and protest by groups whose constituency is drawn from
regionally contiguous individuals of common ethnic origin.200
National liberation (or separatist) movements can, Berger adds, be classified
into three distinct types: those which desire to establish their own nation-state by
breaking away from the country they are part of; those who want to "overthrow
a government that they view as dictatorial, exploitative, or under the control of
an external influence;" and those in which a colonial people attempt to gain
independence from a colonial power which tries to maintain its empire. 201
198Schlesinger in Shaw and Wong, p. 137.
199
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200Suzanne Berger, "Bretons, Basques, Scots, and Other European




This section of the thesis concentrates mainly on the first type of separatist
movement—that which attempts to establish territorial control and gain
independence from a country believed by the national liberation movement to be
oppressing its people (e.g., the ETA and FLNC). 202 Apart from the ETA and
FLNC, the majority of the Basque and Corsican people do not always seek
political independence but rather a more distinct voice in the government
(including the economy) of the community" 203 Pressures for separation can be
attributed to the goal of "redistributing power between the central government
and regional authorities, and for granting some measure of self-government to
ethnically distinct minorities." 204 This is the situation in which the Basques and
the Corsicans are cast.
B. NATIONALIST-SEPARATIST CONNECTIONS TO TERRORISM
As a group pursues self-determination against the backdrop of a seemingly
or overtly oppressive government, violence usually accompanies such nationalist-
separatist movements. Frequently described as the "weapon of the weak,"
terrorism is a common political tool used by a majority of nationalist-separatist
movements to pursue their objectives. In general, European separatist groups








respective ethnic regions. The ETA and FLNC, for example, have concentrated
their operations within the Northern Basque region of Spain and the French
Island of Corsica respectively. These groups, however, have occasionally
conducted terrorist activities in Madrid and Paris.
Generally speaking.. .the impact of the European separatist groups, like that
of the Marxist-Leninist groups, has been geographically limited, first to their
respective ethnic regions, and second to their primary targeted country or
country of origin. Of all the European separatist groups, only the IRA has
demonstrated a consistent willingness and capability to operate outside its
targeted country. 2" 1
For the most part, terrorist activities by separatist groups have been used as
blackmail, to increase media exposure, and to influence the targeted country to
negotiate regarding the demands of the "weaker" faction. Violence associated
with "ethnic terrorism" generally "arises from cultural differences that are
exacerbated by perceptions of economic deprivation or exploitation."206
C THE BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY GROUP (ETA)
Established in 1959, the Euskadi ta Askatnsuna (ETA) or Basque Homeland
and Liberty Group, began as a pacifist nationalist movement within the Basque
Nationalist Party (PNV). The PNV, which was founded in 1895, is the oldest of
three Basque political parties. It was the founder of the PNV, Sabino de Arana,
who
205Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #2, p. 68.
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gave shape to the cause of Basque nationalism by baptizing the new
State Euskadi, designing its flag, and working to encourage the
dissemination of the Basque language. Arana laid the foundations of
the Basque nationalist ideology which, among other things, comprised
a dedication to the Catholic religion, the espousal of non-violent
methods to achieve political goals, the belief that all Basques should be
united across the Pyrenees, and the assertion that language should be
the defining characteristic of the Basque race. 207
The two other political parties which comprise the Basque "autonomous
government" are the Euskadiko Eskerra (EE), or Basque Left, and the Herri
Batasuna (HB) or the People's Unity Party. The HB is currently the most radical
Basque separatist party and the political wing of the ETA. Both the PNV and the
ETA have the same sole objective of Basque independence but have divergent
agendas and tactics to achieve it: political plans and terrorism, respectively.
The Basque country region incorporates seven "Basque provinces," including
the north-western provinces of Alava, Navarra, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya in Spain
and the three south-western provinces of Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule in
France (see Appendix D). Collectively, these provinces represent an "ethnically
distinct" region of approximately 20,000 square kilometers with a population of
3 million whose language "is clearly the defining cultural variable."208
According to some historians and ethnographers, the Basques are one of the
oldest European nations; and their language and origin have "nothing in common
207Edward Moxon-Browne, Spain and the ETA: The Bid for Basque




with either Spanish or any other known world language."209 The Basque region
is extremely homogeneous: 92 percent of the families are of Basque origin and
only 8 percent are a mixture of Basque and Spanish.210 The Basques comprise
less than 5 percent of Spain's population. 211
Having escaped annihilation since their origin, the Basques "have nurtured
their individuality and desire for independence for centuries at the cost of great
sacrifices and efforts."212 Since 1936, for example, the undemocratic and
totalitarian Franco dictatorship endeavored to dispose of the Basque culture. The
Basque country in effect was labeled a "treacherous province." 213 Franco
believed that regional separatism would undermine the integrity and effective
functioning of the State. Despite Franco's efforts, the Basques continued to
provide fierce resistance, mostly in the form of passivity. It is in this light that the
young nationalists within the PNV formed the ETA, due to their frustration over
the PNV's perceived stagnation of party achievements under Franco.214
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Since the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Basque industrialization and political
centralism have been the general fundamental causes of Basque nationalist-
separatist revival. The activities of "outside entrepreneurs" seeking economic
gains are viewed as exploitative of the Basque region and fuel resentment.
Furthermore, past attempts by the Franco government to destroy the Basque
language (Euskera), long considered the "central cultural feature" of the Basque
people, have specifically added to their nationalist fervor. It is the Basque
language which is "the central focus for Basque nationalism."215
After its formation in the 1950s the ETA split into two major factions in
1974: ETA political-military and ETA military. Since the Basques were granted
limited home rule in 1982, only the latter faction has been active. With a cadre
of approximately 100 to 200 members (plus supporters), the ETA's main activities
include kidnappings, assassinations of Spanish governmental and military





16Pluchinsky in Yonah, Vol. 14, #4, p. 255.
72
D. THE CORSICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FLNC)
The Corsican National Liberation Front or FLNC (Front de Liberation
Nationale de la Corse) was created in 1976 and has been torn between political
negotiations and terrorist activities.217
A former Genoa possession, the Island of Corsica was sold to France in
1768. 218 Corsica is 8,680 square kilometers in extent, with a population of
approximately 300,000 people who speak the Latin-derived Corsican language.
Corsica, the fourth largest island in the Mediterranean, is situated approximately
100 miles from the southwest coastline of mainland France. 214 Corsica came
under the rigid centralism of the French government during the French
Revolution. Charles de Gaulle realized, however, that France's rigid centralist
governmental system needed to be decentralized to keep pace with the "socio-
political needs" of modern times. It is within this context of decentralization that
the autonomist movements of Corsica "appeared in an increasingly resolute
form."220
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Unlike the Basques, whose political aim of nationalism is to form their own
state, many of the Corsicans are "more concerned about cultural rather than
political autonomy." 221 The Corsican separatist groups can be broadly divided
into two groups: those "believ[ing] that autonomy can be won within the French
state, and those.. .who believe that complete separation, or independence, is the
only solution to Corsica's problems."222 The FLNC adheres to the latter belief
of complete separation for the Corsican "nation" and employs violent methods to
achieve this objective. 223 The aims of many Corsicans, however, are more
aligned with regionalism than with nationalism. Regionalist movements "do not
aspire to form their own national states. ..[but] [u]sually their demands range from
cultural autonomy to the federalist restructuring of an existing state. In an
extreme case, Corsican regionalists argue that their island community should
share nothing but currency, foreign policy, [defense] and certain elements of the
judicial system with mainland France."224
With the exception of Corsica, France has not achieved the level of
decentralization that Spain has established. Since early 1982 Corsica has been the
only French region to have statutory autonomy. This autonomy "was regarded
by many as a model for future autonomy arrangements for other [French] regions,
221
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providing] for a regional legislature that would have power to enact laws
pertaining to secondary school curricula and to '...determine complementary
education activities aimed at preserving the Corsican language and culture.'"225
In 1982 the Corsicans also elected a representative body that was able to
administer a modest budget.226 Corsica also demonstrates its autonomy by
having a regional election system which differs from that in the other 21 French
regions. 227
E. PAST AND CURRENT ETA AND FLNC TERRORIST ACTIVITY
The Basque movement is the most powerful movement of all the national
liberation movements in Western Europe. Although worldwide cooperation has
been successful in curbing Western European terrorism, especially in Germany
and Italy, the ETA remains a major exception. 228 The ETA continues to be
Spain's largest and most ruthless terrorist group.
Influenced by the terrorism of Third World "liberation struggles," the ETA,
which had earlier been rather pacifist, became aggressively offensive and
22;,William Safran, "The French State and Ethnic Minority Cultures: Policy
Dimensions and Problems," in Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson,
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characteristically terroristic in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the commencement of
its armed campaign for independence in 1968, the ETA has been responsible for
over 800 fatalities."4 In 1988 alone, the ETA was implicated in 243 terrorist
attacks, representing 70 percent of Spain's terrorist incidents for that year.230
The following are some of the most notorious terrorist actions by the ETA: the
assassination of the president of the Guipuzcoa province in 1976; the murder of
the military governors of Madrid and Guipuzcoa in 1979; and the assassination
of eight generals, including General Lago Roman in 1982, leader of the most
prestigious Spanish Army division. 231
The ETA also targeted Spain's tourist industry, specifically during its
summer campaigns in 1985-1987. During this period the ETA bombed and
threatened several Spanish resort hotels along the Mediterranean Coast after
mailing 200 threatening letters to foreign embassies (including the British, Swiss,
West German and Belgian embassies), travel agencies, and the Spanish media.232
Studies have shown that "transnational terrorism can severely cripple an economy
229Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Western Europe-92-061, "Marchand
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heavily dependent on foreign tourism.... [A] typical incident could scare away
approximately 140,000 tourists when all monthly impacts are aggregated."233
The ETA's 1992 terrorist campaign began with two car bombs that exploded
in Madrid on 6 and 10 February, killing six and injuring 10. (Nine attacks in
Madrid were carried out in 1991.
P
4 Prior to the 1992 Barcelona Olympic
games, the ETA also conducted four successful car bombings in the Catalonia
region. The National Police, however, in their heightened security status against
terrorist activity, apprehended the ETA member responsible for these attacks as
well as a notebook which outlined the ETA's future targets in Catalonia. In
addition to arresting the ETA member, the police discovered a "safe" apartment
which contained "numerous explosives, weapons, grenade launchers, and
detonators."235 In May 1992, the Basque autonomous region police discovered
another large cache which contained explosives, machine and hand guns,
ammunition, as well as documents targeting policemen and civil guards for future
attacks in the Vizcaya province. 236 The police operations effectively disrupted
the ETA's organization in Catalonia. On 17 August 1992, the ETA broke a two-
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month period of peace (which included the Olympics) by killing two Civil
Guardsman in the Guipuzcoa town of Oyarzun.237 The ETA has killed 20
people in 1992 thus far.
Although the left-wing extremist group, Action Directe, is France's most
notorious terrorist group, the most active terrorist organization in France today
is the Corsican National Liberation Front. Prior to 1991 the FLNC had conducted
over 600 terrorist bombings targeted against Corsica and mainland France.238
The following are the most notable of the FLNC's terrorist campaigns: the
destruction of a grounded Air France airliner in 1976 (181 passengers had already
disembarked); the 1979 bombing of the Ministry of Finance in Paris; the 1981
bombing of the Ministry of Education; and the 1982 bombing campaign on the
Corsican island which included roughly 800 explosions.239
Since its inception, the FLNC has conducted numerous bombing campaigns
interspersed with "truces," often the result of anticipated promises made by the
French government. Breaking a truce in February 1982, the FLNC conducted a
terrorist campaign on Corsica which resulted in the French Cabinet decision to
ban the group in 1983. FLNC's terrorist activity continued moderately until 1986,
with only one other truce announced during the tourist season of 1985. When
237Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Western Europe-92-160, "ETA
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the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), led by Jacques Chirac, and other
center-right parties, won a parliamentary majority in 1986, this "began a period
of 'cohabitation' between a Socialist president [Francois Mitterrand] and a right-
wing prime minister and government.' 04" Such "cohabitation," however,
escalated the level of violence in Corsica. When Mitterrand was reelected
president in 1988, along with a sufficient number of Socialist members of the
National Assembly to permit the Socialists to form a new government, a new
truce was announced by the FLNC which anticipated the new Left-wing
government's openness towards Corsican autonomy.241
In late 1989, however, the FLNC, after giving warning, conducted a new
terrorist campaign targeting those involved with the expansion of Corsica's tourist
industry.
[T]he FLNC bombed coastal holiday complexes still under construction and
existing business premises, notably tourist facilities of Corsican and
international speculators. Prior to these attacks the FLNC had focused on
the broader separatist/ anti-French cause. Targets then included government
buildings, French banks, police stations and French holiday homes.242
Since those incidents in 1989, the FLNC has been relatively inactive.
24l,Wieviorka, Michel, p. 159.
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F. ETA AND FLNC GOALS AND AGENDA
The ETA's "principal political objective is the establishment of a Leninist
orientated state and the destruction of the constitutional system of self govern-
ment adopted by the Basque people by referendum in 1980."243 Even though
the autonomv which Madrid granted the Basque people is "relatively generous,"
the ETA regards such autonomy as an "interim solution," of which the end goal
is to unite the seven Basque provinces into an "independent state."244
The basic aims of ETA have remained very much the same as they were 10
or 20 years ago: to achieve the independence and reunification of Euskadi
[Basque state]. The right of the Basque people to determine their own fate,
to be sovereign in their own country, lies at the heart of ETA ideology. 245
The political violence demonstrated by the ETA is not irrational but is usually
considered a symbolic act "whose significance far outweighs any material or
human damage caused."246 The ETA has been known to target national and
local police, the army and the paramilitary Civil Guard, as well as civilians.247
The Corsicans have demanded recognition of both their national identity and
the right to self-government. They consider themselves a "historic people,"
distinguishable from mainland France by their language, history, culture, and
243George and Watson, p. 348.
244
Alter, p. 138.




"Spain's Top Basque Guerilla is Seized in France," in The New York Times,
March 30, 1992, p A7.
80
identity. The Corsicans object to what they consider to be the "internal
colonization" of their island through "Parisian culture and economic colonization"
from the mainland.248 The FLNC uses terrorism and violence to pursue its
demands, and it insists upon the formation of an independent Corsican state.
The FLNC, along with other Corsican nationalist organizations, has "advocated
a more or less revolutionary mixture of independence and social justice."249
Both the ETA and FLNC insist upon forming an independent state through
violent terrorism. The ETA's terrorist activity concentrates on military and
governmental officials, whereas the FLNC's terrorist activity is directed toward
military and governmental buildings.
G. TRENDS OF NATIONALIST-SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
Since the 1980s, the ETA's violence has decreased, reflecting the judgment
by the majority of the Basque people that the ETA's methods for Basque
independence are no longer the optimal solution. Within the last few years, the
Basque people's attitude toward the ETA has switched from one of "trust" to one
of fervor for its "dismantlement." Basque leaders have also mentioned that an





an "atmosphere of hope" to the Basque people. 2 " In fact, the former leader of
HB, Inaki Esnaola, believes that "for a large portion of the Basque people the
armed struggle is an unviable strategy"2 ' 1 Furthermore, the PNV, which heads
the Basque region's coalition government, also believes that the ETA no longer
represents the desires of the Basque people but represents only the ETA members
themselves.232 "Despite a hard core of sympathizers in their home territory,
however, neither the [HB] nor ETA are thought to be growing, and there are signs
that some ETA factions now believe that terrorism has become counterproduc-
tive."
2^ The Popular Party has also backed a growing campaign to ban the
ETA's political wing, HB, which "acts as an apologist for ETA terrorism."254
Referring to the HB, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez encouraged Spain's
legal authorities " to prosecute all those who defend terrorism or issue terrorist
threats." 2 "
3
Gonzalez's statement provides further evidence of Spain's total
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commitment to combat the ETA, which he feels is locked into violence and
refuses more democratic means of gaining autonomy.236
The ETA, having also committed terrorist attacks in Italy and Germany, will
likely continue to do so in an effort to "force the respective governments to
'advise' Spain on the need to negotiate with the terrorists [ETA]."2
"'7 These
efforts are seen as fruitless since the Spanish government is vehemently opposed
to any negotiations with the ETA. Governmental contacts with the ETA are not
ruled out; however, the condition of stopping all killing by the ETA must first be
met.
The ETA remains a threat and a constant source of anxiety to Spain. The
French Basque region, however, still remains an operational base for ETA
planning and training activities as well as a place of refuge and a source of
weapons and ammunition. France is further relied upon as a sanctuary for the
ETA's leadership, arsenals, and financial resources, "although some of their
finance comes from the 'revolutionary tax' that they extract in Spain."258
Estimates reveal that the ETA attempted to extort approximately 400 million
pesetas from Basque businessmen within a nine month period during a Basque
police surveillance operation in 1991-1992. Not only did this operation reveal the
256
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enormous "personal loss and serious harm to the economy of the Basque country,"
but it also confirmed "the profound relation linking the terrorist ETA with
everyone sheltering under the name of the People's Unity Party [HB]." 2:>9
Even after the arrest of the ETA's top leadership in March 1992, the ETA
continued its car bomb attacks in Madrid in June 1992, wounding 10 soldiers and
three civilians.260 According to Spain's Minister of Defense, Julian Garcia
Vargas, the ETA will probablv "continue to make attacks of this kind, probably
more serious ones, for a long time to come." 21' 1
Since the 1988 cease-fire agreement signed between the FLNC and the
French government, Corsica has remained peaceful. The statute of autonomy
granted to the Corsican island has given greater power to Corsican authorities.
A ruling by a French constitutional tribunal, however, has robbed the
agreement of much of its symbolic value. Many in Paris fear that the era of
dialogue could change into a new period of violence.262
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H. COMBATTING NATIONALIST-SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN
WESTERN EUROPE
In 1980, the French implemented a two-pronged counterterrorist plan against
domestic and international terrorism. To combat domestic terrorism, whatever
its Left, Right, or separatist source, the French established stricter law enforcement
and "preventive police work" which included "infiltration and surveillance of
extremist groups.
"
2b3 Former French home secretary Raymond Marcellin
cogently described this new attitude:
The best method of combatting terrorism, for intelligence and
prevention as well as repression, consists of creating police squads,
voluntary insofar as possible, that are specialized in dealing with this
particular form of crime. 2,4
Unfortunately, domestic terrorism intensified during the 1980s. During the
1970s, the media exposure seemingly repressed and minimized the violence and
terrorism. The increase in violence and terrorism was nonetheless sometimes
attributed to increased media exposure in the 1980s. 263 In an effort to further
reduce domestic violence, the French government granted amnesty to radical
groups in 1981, including Corsican separatists, and it granted a "regionalist policy"









truces were broken, however, and the violence and terrorism of other groups such
as Action Directe continued to be prevalent, the French government successfully
increased its efforts to combat domestic terrorism in the middle 1980s through the
Police Intelligence Bureau and the Antiterrorist Coordination Unit. As the Chirac
government toughened its stance against terrorism in Corsica in 1986, however,
Corsican violence escalated in response.
When the new Socialist government of Michel Rocard came to power in
France in 1988, Corsica was the only source of domestic terrorism. As opposed
to the Chirac government, which concentrated on police efforts to combat
terrorism, the Socialists chose political initiatives toward its abolishment. The
government made commitments concerning Corsica's economic development,
culture, and language, and took measures against rigged elections.267
In essence, "[t]wo major logic systems have prevailed in France during the
past 10 years. The Left, while modifying its practices by placing more emphasis
on law enforcement, has endeavored to deal with domestic terrorism politically,
whereas the Right has sought to handle it by police methods."268
When King Juan Carlos brought democracy back to Spain, he also attempted
to diminish Basque violence by giving the Basque people more autonomy in






Constitution in 1978 "recogniz[ed] the legitimacy of regional aspirations."269 In
1980 a new regional government was formed in the Basque country where the
regional PNV predominated over Spain's national parties.
A hopeful sign in countering the Basque movement has been the recent
arrests of ETA members. In March 1992 a severe blow was dealt to the ETA
when four leaders, including the top two leaders, Francisco Mugica Garmendia
and Jose Luis Alverez Santacristina, along with six others, were apprehended by
French police. 270 A month earlier, Sabino Euba, the ETA member responsible
for the group's finances, was also arrested.271 The arrest of virtually all the ETA
chiefs was one of the most severe setbacks in ETA's history. Often accused by
the Spanish government of being "lax" with regard to monitoring ETA activities
and pursuing ETA terrorists along the Spanish-French border, France's capture
of the ETA's leadership clearly demonstrated a French determination and commit-
ment to combat terrorism. 272
Since 1980, police and governmental cooperation between Spain and France
has significantly reduced ETA's terrorist activities. France and Spain signed an
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antiterrorism accord in 1987 which has proven to be successful.273 In conjunc-
tion with police action, the signing of the antiterrorist pact in 1989 between all
Spanish parliamentary parties except the HB has also led to the discouragement
of ETA terrorism. 274 Under this Pact, all parties agree to the end of violence and
advocate democratic means to resolve Basque nationalist-separatist issues.
Both the ETA and FLNC have fought to achieve independence and further
autonomy mainly through the use of terrorism. The bloodthirsty ETA has
focused its campaigns on public figures, while public buildings and the tourist
industry have been targeted by the FLNC. Since its beginning in the 1950s, the
ETA has been responsible for over 800 fatalities, while the FLNC has been
responsible for over 600 bombings since its inception in the 1970s. The terrorist
activities of these two groups have undoubtedly caused noteworthy damage and
personal loss. The autonomy granted to the Corsicans in 1988, however, as well
as the ongoing negotiations between the Spanish government and Basque country
officials, have seemed to curtail the level of terrorism and violence in these
regions. Recently these terrorist groups have, in essence, lost their political
punch. This is especially true with regard to the ETA, because most if not all of
its leadership has been arrested, and because the majority of the Basque people
no longer side with the terroristic approach to achieving their goals.
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Although the current trend of nationalism "will undoubtedly impact on the
nature and course of international terrorism," nationalist-separatist terrorism in
France and Spain seems to have been unaffected by the movements in Eastern
Europe. 2" Although nationalist-separatist movements have continually existed
in Western Europe, it is too early to tell if the current unleashing of nationalist
fervor in the East will intensifv the separatist movements of the ETA in Spain and
the FLNC in France.
The separatist movements within Europe could possibly lead to a new surge
of terroristic violence in the future. For example, Scottish people indicate a
growing but less violent discontent with England. In fact, half of the Scottish
people polled in February 1992 were in favor of self-government, up sharply from
previous polls.276 According to Norman Gelb, such an increase in Scottish
nationalist desires has been "stimulated" by other examples of secession and "by
the nationalist fever sweeping parts of Europe. ..giving rise to the sense that
perhaps the time for a change has come." 277
275Probst in Defense 92, p. 27.
276Robin Knight, "Nationalism," in U.S. News & World Report,
February 10, 1992, p. 17.
277Norman Gelb, "Scottish Grumbling," in The New Leader, December 2-16,
1991, p. 6.
89
VI. COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE EUROPEAN TERRORISM
A. EUROPE'S OPEN BORDERS/IMPLICATIONS FOR TERRORISM
Most of the European Community is on the verge of becoming a Europe
without borders. The Single European Act (SEA), implemented in 1987, set out
to accomplish a major objective in the European Community: to establish a
European internal market before 1 January 1993. 278 The fundamental element
of the EC's internal market program is to remove all non-tariff barriers within the
twelve-state community, allowing for the freer movement of people and goods
and their associated means of transport. :7q
Effective January 1, 1993, there will be no customs checks for any traveler
crossing internal EC borders. Foreign travelers will encounter customs only when
first entering an EC country. A person's passport will be stamped at the point
of entry into the EC, allowing him to cross any border of any other EC country
without being required to show his passport again. A traveler will normally not
see a customs official until he is about to leave the European Community
278The European Single Act: Countdown to 31 December 1992 .
Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, October 1990, p. 3.
279F.E.C Gregory, "Police Cooperation and Integration in the European
Community," in Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism—An International Tournal, Vol.
14, #3. New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1991, p. 145.
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entirely- 2*" With such frontier controls and restrictions to trade removed,
however, there exists a fear and an expectation within the EC of increased crime
and an increase in terrorist activity.281 Since European authorities are very
concerned about illegal immigration and terrorism, extensive computer checks of
non-EC citizens at initial points of entry will be implemented.282
Immigration controls and customs checks are visible signs that the European
Community is divided into separate states. Traditionally, borders are marked by
signs, physical barriers, and the presence of official personnel. Border checks
have been used as a means of controlling the movement of goods and people in
order to restrict the import of banned goods, such as drugs, and to prevent the
admission of undesirable aliens. 283 The removal of these barriers will constitute
one of the most direct and visible benefits of the Community to its citizens.
Throughout this century efforts to control the movement of people and goods
have increased as national frontiers have been strengthened. Consequently/ as the
ability to cross borders has increased, EC governments have sought to exert
280
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greater control. Thus, implementation of the SEA to abolish frontier controls
within the EC represents a dramatic reversal of this trend.284
Since 1985, the EC Commission has progressively introduced measures to
rationalize and relax checks and controls on services, people, goods, and capital
traveling or being transported between member states. The Commission aims to
completely remove all such systematic internal frontier controls by the end of
1992 to create a real "Europe without frontiers."285 To replace customs control,
random or "spot checks" within the frontier have been discussed but may never
materialize because such procedures would go against the spirit and intent of the
SEA.
The lessening of political and economic boundaries in Europe, however, has
allowed the activity of organized crime to increase, including terrorism and
industrial espionage.286 With an abundance of weapons and explosives readily
available from the Afghan and Persian Gulf wars, among other recent conflicts,
there is an underlying fear that these weapons will be easily transported inside
Europe without detection. The new frontier system will allow one to travel from
284
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the southernmost to the northernmost part of Europe without once being
stopped. 287
Britain's ability to monitor personnel movements into and out of its territory
more effectively than any other European state has led to the argument for the
continuation of frontier controls, or at the very least, the reassessment of the role
that frontiers play in protecting the safety and security of individual states.288
Other countries, including Denmark and Greece, are also concerned about the
planned abolition of frontier controls by 1993. Such controls are seen by these
states as "mechanisms" for countering terrorism and other crimes.289
With regard to the movement of goods, the EC Commission White Paper
takes the position that existing customs checks and border controls are "largely
ineffective" in preventing illegal movement of goods (principally firearms and
drugs) and cause "unnecessary delay and expense."290 After 1992, checking
vehicles between member states will no longer be normal customs procedure, and
documentation of goods will only take place at the final destination. The
argument raised by Britain and other EC states is that the existing border control
system, ineffective as it may seem, should not be replaced by a system which may
287
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prove to be totally ineffective. 2
" 1 What seem to be the driving forces behind the
EC's reluctance to concentrate on the negative side of Europe's new frontier are
the economic attractiveness and strong psychological benefits of having a "Europe
of free movement" once the SEA is fully enacted.
One response to this border issue is to strengthen the EC's external border
controls to provide a more intensive surveillance of Europe's coastline and the
frontier between the EC and Eastern Europe. Whether the staffing at the external
borders of the EC will increase as national border controls are removed remains
to be seen. What will be needed, however, is a common EC policy on controlling
illegal immigration and arresting international criminals at these frontier borders
as the emphasis shifts from national to community concern.292 The EC, for
example, has proposed that all twelve member states adopt a common procedure
to repatriate illegal aliens circulating within the EC.293
Many EC states are concerned about the scale of certain criminal activities,
particularly terrorist acts and drug smuggling, as well as coping with immigration
(both legal and illegal), which has recently become a top priority on the political
291
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agenda within the community.294 With an estimated 10 million immigrants in
Europe, many EC politicians believe that Europe is "full," and that emphasis must
therefore be put on tightening immigration and asylum laws. People are
immigrating into Germany more than any other European country because of
Germany's economic attractiveness. Germany acquired more than 1 million
immigrants in 1990 alone because the border between Germany and Eastern
Europe is as porous as a sieve. 24
"
1 As a result, nearly every political party in
Germany is recommending changes to the constitution, which currently grants
automatic entry to anyone who professes to be fleeing persecution.296 As it
stands, almost anyone can claim persecution and take refuge in Germany,
including terrorists in disguise. The Commission is therefore seeking to intensify
screening procedures at ports, airports, and other control points. Since visa
requirements vary among EC member states, illegal aliens and terrorists can gain
access to the EC via countries with the fewest entry requirements and then travel
freely from state to state. Standardization of visa policies must be reached by the
EC to effectively control immigration and illegal entry. In addition, efforts by
European countries to curtail illegal immigration would be more effective if they
294Robert Rice, "Europe's Need for a Common Front," in Financial Times, July
23, 1991.
295John Rossant, Igor Reichlin, and Blanca Riemer, "The
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increased border patrols and severely punished companies employing illegal
workers. 2
"7
To date, cooperation on immigration policies within the EC has been
confined to two conventions: the Convention on Asylum and the Convention on
the Crossing of External Borders. Under these two conventions, asylum-seekers
will be restricted to filing their applications in one specified member state only,
and member states will cooperate in "imposing visa requirements on nationals of
the same countries and sanctions on transport operators which carry people not
in possession of the required visas or travel documents."298 The EC Commission
has estimated that the number of asylum-seekers rose in the EC from 169,000 in
1988 to 327,000 in 1990, with the focus primarily on Germany and France (60%
and 20% respectively).299 The connection between immigration and terrorism
is that with increased immigration, terrorists or those who support terrorist
activity may gain access to Western European countries. The main immigration
flows are from the former Warsaw Pact countries and from the Middle East
region.
The SEA, once implemented, would establish a common policy among the
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promote inter-governmental collaboration for increased measures regarding
refugee problems, drug-trafficking and terrorism.
But, to the dismay of several member governments, the plan rules out
giving decision-making powers on foreign policy to the Brussels-based
commission [EC]. Instead, it calls for closer inter-governmental collaboration
on foreign policy, immigration, and crime-fighting, with minimal involve-
ment from Brussels.300
B. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE COOPERATION
Combatting terrorism in Europe will take on greater significance as border
controls are eliminated within the EC. Close cooperation by governments will
therefore be needed to effectively identify, locate, track, apprehend, prosecute,
and punish terrorists. 301
Currently, INTERPOL, the EC's TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, and Violence
International), and the Schengen Group are the three major international
mechanisms combatting European terrorism. INTERPOL is a 150-nation
international police organization whose origins stem from its predecessor, the
International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), established in Vienna in
1923.302 INTERPOL provides law enforcement authorities that are part of its
300Shada Islam, "Europe, Ready or not, here comes the borderless future,"
World Press Review, November 1991, p. 10.
301George and Watson, p. 350.
302Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p.
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organization with vital information necessary for combatting international
crime.303 Not only does it deal with ordinary crimes, but in 1986 it extended its
efforts to the pursuit of terrorists. 304 The Counter-terrorism Unit of INTERPOL,
which became operational in 1986, has as one of its objectives to foster coopera-
tion among law enforcement agencies in the international fight against terror-
ism.305
Through TREVI and the Schengen Group of countries, the EC has been the
scene of extensive counter-terrorism work on several levels, including security,
intelligence, law enforcement, and collective political action.306
The Schengen Group of countries, named after a small town in Luxembourg
where the agreement was signed, consists of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Germany. 307 In 1990, these five countries signed the Schengen
Agreement which outlined the gradual abolition of checks at their common
303
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borders.308 The Schengen Agreement will act as a blueprint for the rest of the
EC member states as cooperation among the Schengen countries' frontier control
agencies is enhanced. This cooperation will be a response to the relaxation of
internal frontiers. Under the Schengen Agreement, ways to handle such issues as
drugs, firearms, ammunition, mutual judicial assistance, frontier controls, frontier
surveillance, visas, and rules on stays by aliens are addressed. 309 Thus, EC
member states are expected to cooperate within a common framework regarding
various policing matters. Issues of controlling immigration, cooperation among
police forces, border security, and the apprehension of terrorists will take on
greater significance, however, as Europe's frontiers are further opened.310
Although the Schengen Accords call for barrier-free travel within the EC by 1993,
an essential component for a legitimate single market, illegal immigrants, asylum-
seekers, and terrorists may also find it easier to travel within the member
countries. 311
Established in 1977, TREVI (named after the famous fountain in Rome) is a
forum where Ministers and senior officials of EC countries meet regularly to
308Gregory, p. 150.





discuss intelligence and other matters. 312 The TREVI Group is divided into four
committees, each with a particular emphasis. TREVI 1 concerns itself with
terrorism and related matters, while TREVI 2 concentrates on information
exchange regarding police methods and techniques. TREVI 3 directs its efforts
towards serious crimes apart from terrorism.313 TREVI 4 "was established to
examine the policing and security implications of the European Single Market
after 1992.
"
314 Other measures agreed upon at TREVI include coordinating visa
arrangements, reviewing extradition procedures, strengthening airport security,
and handling abuses of diplomatic immunity.315 One of TREVI's most valuable
contributions is its secure communication system for sharing sensitive information
regarding terrorism.
The activities of TREVI will become even more relevant in the next few
years with the advent of the Single European Market and with the Channel
Tunnel becoming operational in 1993. With regard to the Single European
Market, TREVI will concern itself with measures to combat terrorism and ways
to increase police and security as border controls are removed. These measures
312Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, by the Institute
for East-West Security Studies, New York. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press,
1987, pp. 28-29.
313Anderson, p. 3.




include "exchanges of police personnel between EC states, co-operation on police
training and improving methods of border surveillance."316 The Channel
Tunnel, which will connect the UK and France, could become a terrorist target
because "of the media publicity that would be gained from destroying it."317
One of the major technical problems in combatting terrorism is the lack of
sufficient intelligence information.318 The gathering, analyzing, and disseminat-
ing of timely intelligence information regarding terrorist movements and activities
is an extremely difficult, yet essential part of combatting terrorism.319
In spite of this problem, the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO
countries discuss anti-terrorist measures. One of the most important aspects of
Western cooperation has been the strengthening of multilateral police and
intelligence cooperation. This cooperation takes place at five different levels:
1. INTERPOL has acted as a clearinghouse for information.
2. NATO has developed a valuable system for exchange of intelligence
concerning terrorist weapons, personnel and techniques, which has been of
great assistance to member states.
3. Joint training visits and exchanges of security personnel are now well
established among the EEC and NATO countries.
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317
Ibid., p. 351.
318Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian
Democracy," in William Gutteridge, ed., Contemporary Terrorism . New York:
Institutes for the Study of Conflict, Facts on File Publications, 1986, p. 197.
319Tompkins, p. 10.
101
4. Bilateral co-operation has been provided on an ad hoc basis at the
request of governments. Thus, the British SAS personnel, techniques and
weapons have been made available to support Dutch and West German
counter-terrorist operations. And the West German computer bank of data
on terrorists has been used in the fight against terrorism in Italy and else-
where.
5. There is a permanent structure of police co-operation between EEC
member states of particular value in combatting cross-border terrorism.320
In an effort to suppress international terrorism, the world community has
concluded eight global anti-terrorist conventions in the spirit of cooperation and
collaboration. They are as follows:
1. The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention);
2. The Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (Hague Convention);
3. The Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention);
4. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
(Montreal Protocol);
5. The Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents (Convention on Protected Persons);
6. The International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages (Hostages Convention);
7. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (IMO Convention);
8. and The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
320Wilkinson in Gutteridge, p. 49.
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Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf (IMO Protocol).
The Tokyo Convention, the Hague Convention, and the Montreal Conven-
tion seek to protect cargo, crew, and passengers from terrorists, as well as
expeditiously redirecting any hijacked plane, cargo, or personnel to its original
destination. 321 The Convention on Protected Persons exchanges information
among member states in order to prevent or "prepare for attacks on interna-
tionally protected persons within or outside their territories."322 The Hostage
Convention seeks to prosecute or expedite apprehended terrorists who take
hostages within a country which is party to the convention. 323 "The Montreal
Protocol, the IMO Convention, and the IMO Protocol, having only recently been
concluded, are not yet in force."324
C. TOWARDS FUTURE COOPERATION
The manifestations of terrorism will continue into the 1990s and will expand
to take advantage of the new vulnerabilities of modern and free democratic







Future terrorists are likely to be more sophisticated and outfitted with
technologically advanced weaponry.325 NATO nations are continuing to
develop multinational counter- terrorist strategies, however, that will safeguard
democratic values. Although NATO countries collectively cooperate to fight
terrorism, it is evident that the NATO organization itself has no mechanism for
counter-terrorism. NATO does have a special committee that concerns itself with
espionage, subversion, and terrorism, however; but it is seen as a "counter
intelligence rather than a counter-terrorism agency."326
It has been suggested that a joint NATO counter-terrorism coordinating
committee be instituted to further augment current anti-terrorism measures. The
four principal reasons for this NATO committee are as follows:
1. This committee would allow the United States, which is currently only
an observer to the TREVI Group, to become further involved in fighting
terrorism.
2. It seems natural for NATO to take the lead against terrorism since the
majority of terrorist attacks are against [NATO] military targets.
3. NATO's "very structure and special expertise in security matters" could
effectively "coordinate anti-terrorist measures across multiple fronts,
bilaterally and multilaterally."
4. NATO's well coordinated planning and liaison with the military could
effectively implement a counter-terrorist strategy.327
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In addition to this proposed counter-terrorism coordinating committee,
NATO governments are also considering the institution of an international
criminal code and court which would be able to investigate, try, and sentence
those people convicted of serious international crimes, including drug trafficking,
war crimes, and international terrorism. 328
Although INTERPOL, the Schengen Group, and TREVI have been helpful
in combatting terrorism in the past, the transnational cooperation between EC
governments and their enforcement agencies must be improved to keep pace with
the implications of the SEA. Presently, police collaboration with member states
is conducted on three levels. First, all member states are members of INTERPOL.
Secondly, member states exchange information through TREVI. Lastly, the
informal collaboration between police and other agencies within the EC is
growing.329 When border controls are totally abolished, however, such collabo-
ration among member states must either be strengthened, or the EC must develop
a new form of comprehensive European police cooperation.
Furthermore, as European states continue to integrate, there have been
proposals to develop a unified law enforcement agency. Chancellor Kohl, for
example, has proposed a "European FBI," similar to the United States FBI, which
would require a "federal" criminal law framework and the establishment of an EC
328Wilkinson in Slater, p. 103.
329Alderson, p. 239.
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ministry position to which EC states would be accountable. Another idea similar
to that for an EC FBI is the concept of a European police or "EUROPOL,"
suggested by retired British Chief Constable John Alderson. Under this concept
police collaboration would improve through a more organized use of police
officers and staff, allocated on a permanent basis. Alderson envisions that such
ad hoc squads of police officers from different EC states could be used to handle
common EC-wide crime and law enforcement issues, including terrorism.330
There are various views among the EC states regarding the viability of an
EC FBI or EUROPOL. Although neither system has yet to be implemented, all
agree that each represents a long-term goal in interstate law enforcement coopera-
tion.331 The major stumbling block is the reluctance to transfer sovereignty from
member states to the institutions and processes of the EC.332 Whatever the
framework adopted, it is clear that greater cooperation between the various law
enforcement and customs agencies must be encouraged to effectively combat
terrorism within Western Europe after 1992.






Terrorism has been one of the most serious challenges facing Western
European democracies and security in the past twenty years, and it will continue
to remain so in the 1990s. The main sources of terrorist activity which have
plagued Europe during this period have been indigenous left-wing ideologically-
motivated terrorist groups, indigenous nationalist-separatist movements, and
foreign terrorist organizations, primarily from the Middle East, which operated
on European soil.
Although left-wing terrorism, which predominated in the European
continent in the 1980s, has subsided, nationalist-separatist movements are
resurging. The urge for national self-determination is a powerful incentive which
has been stimulated with renewed passion in Western Europe as a wave of
nationalist-separatist movements is appearing in the East. Left-wing terrorist
organizations, such as Germany's Red Army Faction, have substantially curtailed
their acts of violence as Marxist-Leninist ideology has been discredited due to the
demise of communism and the subsequent disintegration of the former Soviet
Union. Such groups will still pose a threat to Western European democracies as
long as capitalism and free-market economies continue to thrive.
The Soviet Union, despite its denial of such activities, played a major role
in support of international terrorism and terrorist groups. The Soviet Union
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supported any terrorist group which could achieve destabilizing effects and
politico-military goals, regardless of "left" or "right" wing stance. The Soviet
Union supported groups that were anti-capitalist, anti-NATO, anti-American, and
anti-Zionist. Furthermore, the infrastructure of terrorism in Soviet-supported
states aided the Soviet Union's objective of promoting wars of national liberation.
Largely ignored and considered a predominantly intelligence-gathering
organization, the KGB was the Soviet Union's strong arm and principal
instrument in conducting terrorism abroad. To destabilize the West, especially
NATO and the European Community (EC), the Soviet Union used the KGB to
accomplish its goals through terrorism and murder. The KGB trained, assisted,
and encouraged world-wide terrorist groups, most notably the PLO.
With the political upheavals that took place in the Soviet Union in 1989-1991,
the KGB has discontinued support and training of terrorist organizations. The fall
of the Communist Party has basically rendered the KGB useless in all of the
former Soviet republics except Russia, where its focus has shifted from
political/ military espionage to economics and industry.
Presently, Eastern Europe and the newly formed Commonwealth of
Independent States are experiencing revolutionary and political change.
Nationalistic fervor and suppressed ethnic and religious rivalries have increased
and may well contribute to international terrorism. Although former Warsaw
Pact countries have ceased their support of terrorism, the unemployed terrorist
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supporters in those countries could look for employment in Western Europe or
be hired by Middle Eastern terrorist organizations.
Middle Eastern terrorist activity will continue to be a major security concern
for Western Europe, especially as the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism
continues to grow. Further compounding this problem will be Europe's
continued struggle to manage the influx of foreign immigrants, notably the large
number of Muslim minorities. Adding to an already substantial Arab population,
this influx could conceivably assist terrorist networks and infrastructures aimed
at Western Europe. Moreover, countries that supported and sponsored terrorist
activity in Western Europe will continue to thrive as will their individual leaders,
whose modus operandi is terrorism itself.
Ethnic terrorism resulting from nationalist-separatist movements such as the
ETA, the FLNC, and the IRA could be an important trend in Western Europe in
the 1990s as the "nationalist fever" sweeps across Europe, exemplified so
poignantly in the Balkans. Paradoxically, just as Europe is on the verge of a new
frontier, becoming a "borderless" entity, ethnic groups are also demanding
autonomy and self-determination as never before.
Nationalism and ethnic-separatist movements have long been a source of
terrorism plaguing Western European democracies and will continue as the
"probable political engines" of the future now that "bitter historic ethnic rivalries
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are currently being played out across the European continent."333 As nationalist-
separatist movements are increasing in Eastern Europe, similar movements are
expected to increase in Western Europe. According to an unnamed senior U.S.
administration official, "[violence spawned by movements for self-determination
[is] going to get worse before it gets better."334 In his view,
[i]ncreasing calls for self-determination, violent or otherwise, will simply be
a fact of life now that the removal of Soviet control has started history
ticking again in Europe. That can be seen even in civilized Western Europe,
where in a way the umbrella identity of the European Community seems to
have encouraged the agitation of minorities.335
Nationalism remains one of the strongest forces in politics today, and the
solution to the nationalist-separatist problem "lies in striking a balance between
the demands of national minorities for political, economic and social equality and
the need to preserve the integrity and cohesion of the state."336
Despite world efforts to control and detect the unlawful use and transfer of
Semtex and other plastic explosives, Semtex will continue to be a viable option
for terrorist activities. Already at the disposal of many terrorist organizations,
Semtex is readily available, easy to conceal, and hard to detect. Although Semtex
is now being produced with an additive to "tag" the substance for detectability,
'Probst in Yonah, p. 234.
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the two million pounds of old Semtex currently in circulation must not be
discounted. With an inadequate number of mechanical sniffer devices, coupled
with their exorbitant price and the continuous squabble between the FAA and
airlines over who should pay for them, airports will be unable to effectively detect
the presence of plastic explosive bombs in the near future. Experts in the field
estimate that it will take at least ten years before a foolproof system for detecting
plastic explosives is implemented which can function with 100% accuracy, will be
cost effective enough for mass distribution, and will operate at a speed which will
not unduly slow procedures at airports.w By the time technology finally
reaches a way to detect plastic explosives, however, terrorists may have found a
completely different bomb, making the present system obsolete. For the time
being, Semtex will remain an uncontrollable substance favored by terrorists. The
disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the increasing stocks of plutonium, the continuance of state-
sponsored terrorism, the availability of targets, and the motivational objectives
behind sub-national and terrorist groups ensure that the threat of nuclear
terrorism will remain a critical concern for Western Europe in the 1990s.
As Western Europe approaches its "open frontier" by 1 January 1993, the
manifestations of terrorism will continue to plague its governments. With the




coordinated efforts to identify, locate, track, and apprehend possible terrorists,
who will be able to move more freely in Europe as border controls are removed.
Western Europe will continue to be highly threatened by terrorist activity due to
the abundance of targets which attract both indigenous and foreign terrorist
organizations. Such activity could also increase as Europe further integrates and
eliminates border controls.
Even though INTERPOL, TREVI, and the Schengen Group have been
instrumental in thwarting terrorist activity in Europe, the relaxation of border
controls will require further police collaboration between European Community
member states and NATO countries. Such cooperative efforts must be realized
soon if Europe's attempt to create a "hard outer shell" is to be realized by
1993.338 Although European nations are continuing to develop multinational
counter-terrorist strategies that will safeguard democratic values, terrorism may
increase in Western Europe. The rise in illegal immigration, the freer movement
of people (including terrorists), the removal of internal border controls, and the
absence of an effective policing system once border controls are removed suggest
that terrorism will continue to threaten Western Europe in the 1990s.
'Robertson, 1992, p. 34.
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Source: Probst, Peter S., "The Terrorist Specter of the
1990s," Defense 92, January /February , 1992, pg . 24.
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APPENDIX B
PLASTIC BOMBS IN AVIATION TERRORISM
DATE AIRLINE PLACE RESULT
8/11/82 Pan Am Pacific Ocean, in
route to Honolulu
Bomb explodes in cabin;
1 killed, 15 injured
8/25/82 Pan Am Rio de Janeiro Airport Bomb failed to explode
1/84 Unknown Athens Airport Bomb failed to explode
11/7/84 Lufthansa Frankfurt Airport Man arrested with bomb
6/23/85 Air India Narita Airport, Tokyo Bomb explodes in baggage-
handling area; 2 die
2/86 Unknown Israel Suitcase bomb seized
4/2/86 TWA Between Rome £ Athens . Bomb explodes in cabin;
4 killed
4/17/86 El Al Heathrow Airport Bomb found in woman's
handbag
11/29/87 Korean Air Andaman Sea, in route
to Bangkok
Plane crashed; 115 die
12/21/88 Pan Am Over Lockerbie,
Scotland
Plane crashed; 270 die
9/19/89 UTA Over Sahara, Niger Plane crashed; 171 die
Source: Stecklow, Steve, "Battling an explosive threat
Philadelphia Inquirer , March 31, 1991, pg . E-l.
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APPENDIX C
Stages of nationalistic mobilization. National consciousness is the subjective
awareness of common aspirations, shared visions, and memories (a state of
mind). Nationhood is the objective representation of national consciousness in
the form of permanent, observable, and culturally transferable histories,
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